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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

USING PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES TO UNDERSTAND CITIZEN ATTITUDES
TOWARD GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND COLLABORATIVE
BEHAVIORS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
There have been various approaches to studying the effectiveness of government
performance in public administration. While some have focused on broad organizational
factors, others have taken an individual level approach by applying concepts and methods
from psychology and behavioral economics. This three-essay dissertation continues this
latter approach by examining the role of cognitive mechanisms in explaining citizen
attitudes toward government performance as well as collaborative behaviors in the public
sector.
The first essay explored the role of detailed versus abstract mental construals in
understanding the relationship between expectations of public service performance and
attitudes toward a government. Type of thinking, when it fit well with the information
about either how or why public services were provided, was predicted to produce more
positive attitudes toward government than in the absence of fit. However, these
predictions were not confirmed.
The second essay induced either an abstract or a detailed mode thinking in
participants. Because abstract thinkers are more likely to focus on the desirability of
outcomes, and detailed thinkers are more likely to focus on the feasibility of outcomes, it
was predicted that abstract thinking, compared to detailed thinking, would create higher
expectations of public services and lower perceived government performance. The
findings were inconclusive.
The final essay, combining prospect theory and expectancy-disconfirmation concepts,
proposed a new model testing the relationship between citizen attitudes and collaborative
behavior. Using a cross-sectional data set of US citizens, the results revealed a predicted
non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction with government performance and coproduction.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Many scholars have used concepts from psychology and behavioral economics to
study public administration. The topics examined include leadership and public service
motivation (Bellé, 2014, 2015), transparency of and trust in government organizations
(Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2014; Peisakhin & Pinto, 2010), the role of information
related to government performance (James, 2011a, 2011b), and citizen attitudes toward
governments (Olsen, 2015; Petrovsky, Mok, & Leon-Cazares, 2017; Van Ryzin, 2013).
Also, these studies have applied psychological methods, such as experimental
manipulations and psychometrics, (Baekgaard & Serritzlew, 2016; James, 2011b; James
& Moseley, 2014; Olsen, 2015; Perry 1996; Tummers, 2012). In general, these studies
suggest that the effectiveness of government performance and public services can be
improved by understanding how and why citizens and government officials behave, make
decisions, and collaborate in the public sector (Grimmelikhuijsen, Jilker, Olsen, &
Tummers, 2017; Olsen, 2015; Tummers, Olsen, Jilke, & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016).
This dissertation contributes to this growing body of research in behavioral public
administration by further applying psychological theories and experimental methods to
the study of citizen satisfaction with government performance and behaviors of
coproduction. Although research has examined the connection between citizen
expectations and satisfaction with public services (James, 2011b; Petrovsky et al., 2016;
Van Ryzin, 2004, 2006, 2013), there has been little focus on the cognitive mechanisms
that explain such a relationship. Also, although additional research has examined the
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relationship between citizen satisfaction and citizen participation in the provision of
public services (Bovaird, Van Ryzin, Löffler, & Parrado, 2015; Parrado, Van Ryzin,
Bovaird, & Löffler, 2013), there are few studies incorporating the cognitive mechanisms
that might underlie this connection as well. This dissertation is composed of three
independent essays that incorporated theories from psychology and behavioral economics
to begin to explore possible cognitive mechanisms in each case.
The first essay, described in Chapter 2, is guided by construal level theory (Trope
& Liberman, 2003) and examines the role of detailed versus abstract mental construals
(e.g., thinking about “the trees” or “the forest”) in influencing the relationship between
expectations of public service performance and attitudes toward government. It is
predicted that individuals expecting what government should perform (normative
expectations) would think in abstract-terms, while individuals expecting what
government will perform (empirical expectations) would think in concrete-terms. Also,
people will differently understand the information about why a government provides
public services versus how a government provides public services as a function of these
two types of thinking processes. It is predicted that when the type of thinking fits well
with the information content then more positive attitudes result. In other words,
normative expectation and why information align with abstract thinking, while empirical
expectation and how information align with detailed thinking.
The goal of the second essay, described in Chapter 3, is to evaluate how abstract
and detailed ways of thinking would affect individuals’ perception and judgment of
government performance. People with distinct ways of thinking might consider different
aspects of public services while evaluating public services. Thus, depending on the
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treatments priming individuals to hold different ways of thinking, different relational
patterns among expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction were expected.
This research primes participants to think either in abstract or detailed terms and tested
the effects of expectations and perceived performance of public services on satisfaction
with the services between the two groups.
The final essay in Chapter 4 examines the relationship between citizen
satisfaction with government performance and citizen participation in the provision of
public services (i.e., co-production). Guided by the prospect theory framework and the
expectancy-disconfirmation model, it tests the nonlinear relationship between coproduction and satisfaction by using US citizen data.
Chapter 5 summarizes and discusses the findings, contributions of the
dissertation, limitations, and outlines future studies.
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Chapter 2
The Distinctive Roles of Different Types of Expectations and Information about
Government Performance on Forming Attitudes Toward Governments: The
Differences between Abstract and Concrete Thought Processes

Governments stress the importance of evaluating their performance since the
evaluation is closely related to the efficiency of government performance and
accountability. However, measuring the performance and outcomes of public services is
challenging. Among various approaches for evaluating government performance, one
approach is to assess citizen attitudes toward government performance. Many scholars in
public administration have stressed the importance of citizen expectations of government
performance since those expectations are related to citizen attitudes (e.g., satisfaction
with government performance and trust in governments) and citizen behaviors (e.g.,
choice of services and voting behavior). Some studies have divided expectations into
various categories, including normative and empirical expectations, and evaluated the
relationships between expectations of public services and citizen attitudes toward
government performance. However, there are limited studies on what mental mechanisms
citizens use to understand government performance and form attitudes toward those
governments.
Acknowledging the complexity of citizen expectations about government
performance 1, this essay tests the roles of normative and empirical expectations, as well

1

To design a simple and clear experiment, this essay categorized expectations into normative and empirical
expectations. However, in the real world, individuals could hold both normative and empirical expectations
at the same time. Also, different other than the normative and empirical expectations could play role in
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as information about public services delivered by governments, when people form
attitudes toward such governments. Psychological mechanisms are treated as latent
variables of expectations. Construal level theory, whether citizens think in abstract or
concrete ways (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007), is applied
to evaluate the role of mental mechanisms in individuals’ interpretation of the
information about government performance and the formation of attitudes toward
governments. This essay tests whether participants holding different types of expectations
distinctively understand information about government performance and form attitudes
toward governments based on distinct thought processes. This essay is one of the first to
extend the studies about citizen expectations of government performance by evaluating
what mental mechanisms citizens use when they understand government performance
and form attitudes toward governments.
The following section reviews the theories of expectation formation and related
studies. Then, after introducing the construal level theory, the theoretical argument
connecting normative and empirical expectations with construal levels follows. The
method section describes an experimental design to test the relationships among
expectations, thinking processes, information about public services provided by
governments, and attitudes toward governments. Finally, results are presented, which is
followed by discussion and conclusion of the findings.
The Role of Citizens’ Expectations
Studies of citizen attitudes toward government performance, especially citizen
satisfaction with government performance, have stressed the importance of understanding

citizen attitude formation toward government performance. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper
and save it for future studies.
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the role of expectations (Hjortskov, 2018; James, 2009, 2011a; Poister & Thomas, 2011;
Van Ryzin, 2004). The general concept of an expectation is a personal “anticipation of
future consequences based on prior experiences, current circumstances, or other sources
of information” (Oliver, 2010b, p. 313). In studies of citizen satisfaction, citizen
expectations of government performance were considered as a reference point to compare
with the perceived performance of public services and to judge the service qualities.
Among numerous definitions and measurements of expectations varying across scholars
(Teas, 1993a, 1993b), many studies have focused on normative and empirical
expectations of government performance in public administration (Jacobsen, Snyder, &
Saultz, 2015; James, 2011a; Poister & Thomas, 2011). Normative expectations of
government performance are individuals’ predictions of what should happen in a certain
situation, whereas empirical expectations of government performance are peoples’
anticipations of what will occur in a particular situation (James, 2009).
Citizens’ expectations can have both a normative and an empirical element. For
example, they can reflect an ideal state of the quality a service should have, as well as
consider an empirical prediction of the public service quality. This essay recognizes that
normative and empirical expectations are not clear-cut in the real world. In fact, many
citizens hold both normative and empirical expectations, mixed in many cases, for a
variety of services and agencies. The idea is that one of the two components will tend to
dominate in shaping the performance expectations a citizen holds for a particular service
or agency.

6

Normative Expectations
Normative expectations imply the reasonableness and desirability of public
services, which reflect individuals’ ideas of what is right or wrong in an ideal world or a
particular situation. When people form normative expectations of public services, they
tend to think about the end-state of public services regarding what is tolerable, what is
necessary, and what is desirable. However, whether the expected end-state of the services
occurs or not is less important when individuals hold normative expectations.
Some scholars have measured normative expectations by asking how services
should be provided. In the private sector, Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry (1988)
developed SERVQUAL, which measured consumers’ normative expectations by
instructing people to imagine what an ‘excellent company’ might be. The authors
questioned people about what the company should do, asking them to identify the
desirable features of services in certain contexts. There is also a small number of studies
in public management that measured and evaluated citizen normative expectations
(Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; James, 2011b; Poister & Thomas, 2011). In the field of
public administration, participants were asked how frequently the performance of their
local government should be ‘excellent’ under the context of tax payments, available
resources, and service delivery situations (James, 2009, 2011a). Participants' answers
were recorded in five-point Likert scales, ranging from ‘should be excellent all the time’
to ‘should never be excellent.’
Empirical Expectations
Empirical expectations were defined with diverse terminologies, such as positive
expectations (James, 2011a) and predictive expectations (Barbeau, 1985; Park, 2006).
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Although scholars have used different terms, all terms hold a consistent notion: a
prediction of what will happen in the future. Unlike normative expectations, the
reasonableness, necessity, and desirableness of public services are considered less when
people shape empirical expectations (James, 2011a). Instead, individuals consider what is
likely to occur based on partial information of a situation and their prior experiences
related to services. In other words, empirical expectations are based on individuals’
prediction of the likelihood of future occurrences. For instance, people may expect that
public services provided by their local government will decrease or be limited because of
economic deprivation. Thus, people with empirical expectations examine conditions and
situations that seem to influence the performance of services.
Empirical expectations were measured by asking people to predict how the
quality of public services will be in the future. Van Ryzin (2004, 2006) measured
empirical expectations of participants by asking the level of public service quality they
expected to encounter. More specifically, participants were instructed to remember
several years back and to rate their retrospective expectations of the current overall
quality of public services provided by New York City government. On the other hand,
James (2011a) measured empirical expectations by questioning how frequently they
thought they would experience excellent quality of public services.
Since each type of expectation reflects distinct dimensions, each of them plays a
unique role in evaluating performance and experience with services. In addition,
normative and empirical expectations seem to have different relationships with
satisfaction. Empirically, normative expectations have consistently displayed a negative
direct relationship with satisfaction (James, 2009; Poister & Thomas, 2011), whereas
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empirical expectations have tended to have a positive direct relationship with satisfaction
(Morgeson, 2013; Van Ryzin, 2004).
Furthermore, several studies have suggested that consumers’ expectations of
public services could be managed. Expectations are not fixed; rather, they are flexible.
Diverse factors, including personal past experiences of services, information about
services from third parties, and word-of-mouth, influence consumers’ expectations about
services (Cardozo, 1965; Oliver, 2010b). James (2011a) experimentally tested the effect
of information about previous government performance on people’s expectations of
future government performance. In sum, the research implies that expectations can be
managed by providing appropriate information.
Although scholars agree that information about government performance plays an
important role in developing citizen expectations and forming attitudes toward
governments, there are various approaches about how information influences citizen
expectations and attitudes toward government performance. Among many approaches to
study the processes of expectation formation, the two main approaches are rational
expectations and adaptive expectations. Rational expectation theory proposes that people
form expectations based on the Bayesian learning process, constantly updating their
belief based on the accumulation of new information (Cyert & DeGroot, 1974; Muth,
1961; Snowdon, Vane, & Wynarczyk, 1994). Since an agent holding rational
expectations uses all available information, past frequencies and tendencies of events are
critical when anticipating the future. On the other hand, the adaptive expectation
hypothesis, unlike rational expectation, assumes that recent past experiences or trends
have more influence on forming expectations than the information about the far past ones
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(Nerlove, 1958). Adaptive expectations are updated, not only by available information,
but also by the government performance that actually occurred and experiences of a
person. Therefore, adaptive expectations show behavioral aspects that could be explained
by psychological concepts such as vividness of recall (Oliver, 2010b) and heuristics
(James, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Furthermore, it seems that participants holding different types of expectations
related to public services select and consume information about government performance
in different ways. James (2011a) compared the effects of information on normative and
empirical expectations of government performance. Generally, he found that information
about high past performance increased participants’ expectations while information about
low past performance decreased their expectations. Interestingly, the author further
observed that the information about government performance had inconsistent effects on
each type of expectation of public services. Normative expectations were only affected
by the information about high government performance in the past, while empirical
expectations were affected by information about both high and low previous government
performance. The study implies the possible management of expectations by
understanding how normative and empirical expectations related to public services
corresponds to information about government performance.
Although existing studies have tested the relationships among expectations and
satisfaction related to government performance, there are few studies of citizen
expectations that examined individuals’ cognitive processes. There are limited
explanations as to why normative expectations of public services were more resistant to
the effects of information about poor previous government performance than empirical
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expectations of public services. Yet, concepts or theories from psychology can offer
insight to this question. For instance, ‘representativeness,’ one of the heuristics suggested
by Kahneman and Tversky (1973), might play a role in predicting the future.
Representativeness is a way people predict the future under uncertainty, based on the
existing prototype individuals’ have held at a given time. In the case of James’ study
(2011a), it is possible that the distinct relationships between information and expectation
types related to government performance result from different prototypes individuals hold
about the desirability and feasibility of public services.
What were the cognitive mechanisms that created different relationships between
expectations and information about government performance? This paper uses a
psychological theory, construal level theory, to broaden our understanding of the role of
expectation and information in shaping attitudes toward government performance. The
following section introduces construal level theory, from psychology and consumer
behavior literature, and it discusses possible implications for the relationship between
citizen expectations and information about government performance. This is significant
because the two types of expectations share similar features with the level of construal.

Applying Psychology Theory: Construal Level Theory
Many scholars have demonstrated that individuals use different psychological
ways to understand information, including one's surroundings and others’ actions. For
instance, citizens understand information about public service deliveries by governments
in different ways. Among various ways to think about activities by governments, some
people understand government performance-related information in abstract terms; others
understand these in concrete terms. Individuals who think about government performance
11

in abstract terms consider why governments deliver public services, and those who think
in concrete terms consider how governments deliver public services.
Action identification theory, one of many approaches to studying how individuals
construe activities, argues that cognitive hierarchy leads humans to understand an action
in either concrete or abstract ways (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). A high-level-identity
(abstract) defines an action related to a cause, a reason, a purpose, or a meaning of the
action. On the other hand, a low-level-identity (concrete) explains the action related to
detailed ways of operating the action. People with high-level identities, for instance, tend
to understand “writing a paper” as “expressing thoughts or opinions.” Contrastingly,
people with low-level identities are likely to perceive it as “filling a paper with words.”
Based on many empirical studies demonstrating these distinctive ways of thinking
about actions, Liberman and Trope (1998) included the action identification theory and
further developed this into the construal level theory. Construal level theory explains that
people think in abstract or concrete ways when they perceive things that are
psychologically close or distant to oneself (Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007; Trope &
Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2010). For example, People with a higher construal
level tend to consider the general picture, the forest. They think in abstract and simple
ways. People in a state of a higher construal level think more about essential ideas of a
subject or an event, but less about contexts a subject or an event is situated in. They tend
to be more goal-oriented than others with a lower construal level. On the other hand,
people holding a lower construal level are inclined to focus on trees, but less on the
forest. People in a state of a lower construal level are less goal-oriented and consider
contexts a subject is situated in when they make decisions. Moreover, studies have
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empirically demonstrated the close relationships between individuals’ tendency of action
identification and their construal levels (Freitas, Langsam, Clark, & Moeller, 2008;
Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Kim, Rao, & Lee, 2009). A higher
construal level is connected with abstract information, primary goals, and response to the
desirability of an event; a lower construal level is related with detailed information,
secondary goals, and responding to the feasibility of an event (Liberman & Trope, 1998).
How might these concepts from psychology explain the distinctive effects of
information about government performance on normative and empirical expectations of
public services? The features of normative and empirical expectations seem to share
those of construal levels, especially related to the concept of action identification.
Normative expectations seem to be related to a high level of construal since they are
about goals and ideals rather than existing performance information (James, 2011a).
Normative expectations reflect the reasonableness, necessity, and desirability of public
services, all of which fit the characteristics of a higher construal level because a higher
construal level leads people to consider the goal relevance and desirability of events.
Also, a higher construal could explain why normative expectations were insusceptible to
information about prior poor government performance in James’ study (2011a). When
forming normative expectations of public services, people may perceive information
about poor performance as unnecessary information. Normative expectations help people
think about the excellent quality of services in a certain context. Poor performance is
valueless information when thinking images of reasonable and desirable public services.
However, information about excellent performance might be considered relevant
information when individuals form normative expectations of government performance.
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On the other hand, empirical expectations seem to be related with a low level of
construal, as they are formed based on information about prior government performance
that actually occurred (James, 2011a), which is deeply rooted in context. Since empirical
expectations focus on the specific occurrences of services and less on the desirability of
such services, empirical expectations could be highly sensitive to information about
government performance – especially information about situations and contexts in which
public services are delivered. These characteristics of empirical expectations of public
services fit with the features of a low level of construal because both focus details and
contexts of a subject or an event. Thus, unlike normative expectations, empirical
expectations are quite sensitive to the information about public service deliveries and
government performance that citizens receive.
Flowing from this discussion, the first hypothesis to be tested is:
H1: People holding normative expectations of public services are likely to have
a higher construal level than people holding empirical expectations of public
services.
Therefore, citizens with normative expectations of public services will start to
consider the purpose and desirability of public services provided by governments, which
may lead citizens into a higher construal state. Participants with empirical expectations of
public services may be more aware of their past experience with government
performance and the practical feasibilities of government services, which are the features
of low construal level. It is not expected that people with normative expectations will
always have higher construal levels than people with empirical expectations; however,
the current essay anticipates an average tendency that a normative expectation will induce
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a higher construal level compared to an empirical expectation. Furthermore, a series of
research papers has illustrated that mental representations interact with the framework of
information about a product or a person when forming attitudes toward the subject of the
information, which is discussed in the following section in more detail.
The Fit between Mental Mechanisms and Message Frameworks of Information
As mentioned previously, the match between mental mechanisms and message
frameworks, whether both are compatible or not, influences human performance in
executing tasks (Bar-Anan, Trope, Liberman, & Algom, 2007) and individuals’
evaluation processes (Kim et al., 2009). In this essay, the matching condition between
mental representations and message frameworks is when a person focuses on the
desirability of public services and reads information about government performance
written in abstract terms (e.g., why governments provide public services) because both
are related to a higher construal level. Another matching condition is when an individual
holding a mental representation about the feasibility of public services reads a message
about government performance in detailed terms (e.g., how governments deliver public
services) because both are related to a lower construal level. Mismatch conditions are
when a person thinking about desirability of public services reads a message in detailed
terms and when a person thinking about feasibility of public services reads a message in
abstract terms.
There are various consequences of either a match or mismatch of the levels. When
people read information that matched with their construal level, they were inclined to
perceive the information with more fluency and understand the information more easily,
leading them to 'feel' right about one’s judgment or activities (Reber, Schwarz, &
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Winkielman, 2004). Based on the fluency of information processing, participants were
likely to attribute their feeling ‘right’ about their judgment to a higher quality of the
activity, and therefore, likely to consume the information. However, when they
encountered information that was inconsistent with their mental mechanisms, they
recognized it as less influential and were likely to ignore the information (Petty &
Wegener, 1998; Reber et al., 2004). Thus, people were likely to evaluate the messages
that were consistent with their mental mechanisms as more persuasive than information
that was inconsistent with their construal level (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
In this vein, Kim et al. (2009) argue that the fitness of information and mental
mechanisms shape people’s political attitudes. For instance, in their first experiment,
participants who were primed to have a higher construal level rated the candidate more
favorably and evaluated the statement to be more effective when they read a short
statement about the purposes and reasons for a hypothetical person to be a candidate
compared to the other statement about how the candidate planned to run one’s office.
This essay indicates that information about a candidate, and the way that it’s presented,
influences people’s preferences and judgments of an object or a person.
Based on the literature discussed above, the second hypothesis is:
H2: Participants in the matching condition will form more positive attitudes
toward the governments compared to those in the mismatch condition.
Here, the matching condition is when people holding normative expectations
about public services read a message about why governments provide public services, and
when people holding empirical expectations related to public services read a message
about how governments provide public services. The mismatching condition is when
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people holding normative expectations read a message about the feasibility of public
services provided by governments, and when people holding empirical expectations read
a message about the desirability of public services provided by governments. Figure 2-1.
describes the logic of the first and the second hypothesis. This essay builds the second
hypothesis on the assumption that the first hypothesis in this essay is valid 2: people with
normative expectations of government performance are likely to operate on a higher
construal level while people with empirical expectations of government performance are
inclined to think in a lower construal level. Furthermore, people in matched conditions
will understand information more intuitively and easily compared to mismatched
conditions. This intuitive understanding of the matching conditions may lead people to
form positive attitudes toward governments in evaluating government performance.

Normative
Expectations

Higher Construal
Levels

‘Why’ Message

Empirical
Expectations

Lower Construal
Levels

‘How’ Message

Figure 2-1. Illustration for the second hypothesis
Experimental Design and Materials
In the current essay, a two-by-two between-group experimental design was
conducted: different types of expectations of public services and different message
orientations about government performance as Figure 2-2. illustrates. Since young
students tended to have fewer interactions with governments, the study instructed
2

For convenience to build further assumptions, for rest of this paper I will assume that the first hypothesis
is true from this point.
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participants to think about their hometown local government to help them better engage
with the experiment. The vignettes of message orientations illustrated why or how their
hometown local government delivered public services. For more details of experiment
materials, please see Table A A1 in Appendix A.

Invite respondents and randomly assign (N = 166)
: 2 participants declined to participate and 3 agreed to participate
but did not continued the study

Measure the sense of familiarity of public services (N = 161)
: Management of traffic signal systems, sidewalks, and street cleanness

Normative Expectations (N = 89)

Empirical Expectations (N = 74)

Measure construal level (N = 163)
: Psychological distance

Message (Higher construal condition)
: Why governments provide public services

Message (Lower construal condition)
: How governments provide public services

Arm 1 (N = 41)

Arm 2 (N = 34)

Arm 3 (N = 48)

Arm 4 (N = 40)

Normative Expectations
Why message

Empirical Expectations
Why message

Normative Expectations
How message

Empirical Expectations
How message

Measure Attitudes toward Governments (N = 163)
: Confidence, Emotional Valence, Important, and Trust
Attention Check (N = 163)
: 12 participants failed (3 participants failed in each Arm)
Socio-Demographic Control Variables (N = 151)
Figure 2-2. Experimental design to test the relationship between expectations and
construal levels
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General procedure. After the consent and before the treatment, participants’ sense of
familiarity with the public services was measured as a control variable. In the first stage
of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to either normative (Arms 1 and
3) or empirical (Arms 2 and 4) expectation conditions. Since construal levels were
considered as a result of primed normative or empirical expectations of public services,
construal levels were measured after the first manipulation. Then, participants were
randomly assigned to read a different type of messages, ‘why (Arms 1 and 2)’ or ‘how
(Arms 3 and 4)’ their hometown local government provided urban public services.
Finally, participants’ attitudes toward their hometown local government were measured.
At the end of the experiment, participants provided their socio-democratic information,
such as gender, age, race, and ideology. Also, individuals were requested to think of their
state before taking this survey and asked about their perceived performance of and
satisfaction with the performance of their hometown local government.
Participants. Students who were taking Dr. Voss’s class of American Government in the
fall semester of 2017 at the University of Kentucky were recruited. The participants were
18 years old or older. Students participated as a class activity for credit (5% of their total
class grade) from November 16th to 29th in 2017. The online survey experiment setting
was done in Qualtrics, software that allows researchers to design their survey and to
collect data online 3. Participants accessed the online survey through their computer or
mobile phone. Students received the credit either when they successfully finished the
experiment or when they submitted the alternative task. Those who decided not to

3

For more information, visit http://www.qualtrics.com.
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participate in the study were asked to read a short essay, published by Pew Research
Center, and write a 250-500 words summary of the article to earn equivalent credit in the
class. The material covered citizen attitudes toward governments. The length of the
material to equal the time and effort of participating in the experiment.
To check whether participants were carefully paying attention to the study, a
pseudo-question that instructed them to select only 3 appeared before collecting
individuals’ socio-demographic information. Participants who successfully followed the
instruction continued and finished the study. Those who failed to follow the instruction
could not complete the survey. Participants who failed to complete the survey were
informed that they were unable to complete the experiment and would have to do the
alternative assignment to receive the class credit.
Among 166 students who accessed to the online survey, three decided not to
participate, three decided to participate but did not finish the survey, and 12 participants 4
could not finish the experiment because they failed to pass the attention check. Thus, the
sample size was 151 students (75 females, 74 males; mean of age = 19.86, s.d.age = 4.57).
Among the 151 participants, 118 participants (78.15%) identified themselves as white, 11
participants (7.28%) as African-American, 11 participants (7.28%) as Asian, 2
participants (1.32%) as Native American/American Indian/Alaska Native, 7 participants
(4.64%) as Hispanic, and 2 participants (1.32%) declined to reveal their ethnicity.
The sense of familiarity with public services. Before individuals were assigned to the
first treatment, they were asked about their familiarity with urban services: traffic signal

4

There were three participants in each experimental Arm, total 12 participants, who failed to pass attention
check and continue the study. Therefore, although their responses for expectations of public services
provided by their hometown local government, construal levels, and attitudes toward their local
government were collected, those were not included in the analyses.
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systems, street cleanness, and sidewalk management. Participants’ familiarity with traffic
signal systems (M = 5.03, s.d. = 1.76), road conditions (M = 4.88, s.d. = 1.72), and
sidewalk conditions (M = 4.00, s.d. = 1.78) ranged from 1, very unfamiliar, to 7, very
familiar. Cronbach’s alpha for the three items measuring the sense of familiarity with
traffic signal systems, street cleanness, and sidewalk management was 0.84. Thus, the
average sense of familiarity (M = 4.66, s.d. = 1.54) was used in this essay. See Table 2-1
for a descriptive summary of the statistics of the items.

Table 2-1 Descriptive summary statistics of expectations, attitudes, and control variables
Variables
Mean
s.d.
Minimum Maximum
Expectations (average)
3.94
0.63
2
5
Overall gov. performance
3.89
0.76
2
5
Traffic signal management
4.19
0.87
1
5
Street cleanness
3.81
0.82
2
5
Sidewalk management
3.87
0.81
1
5
Construal levels (average)
4.12
1.17
1
7
Social: closeness
4.66
1.81
1
7
Probability: likeliness
3.80
1.37
1
7
Time: Soon
3.89
1.48
1
7
Attitudes (average)
5.15
1.06
2.50
7.25
Confidence
5.59
1.41
1
8
Emotional valence
4.70
1.26
1
7
Importance
5.63
1.28
2
7
Trust
4.66
1.37
1
7
Control variables
Age
19.86
4.57
18
67
Gender (% female)
0.62
1.10
0
9
Ideology
2.98
1.19
1
5
Perceived performance
4.04
0.89
2
6
Satisfaction
3.95
1.02
1
6
Familiarity (average)
4.66
1.54
1
7
Traffic signal
5.03
1.76
1
7
Road condition
4.88
1.72
1
7
Sidewalk condition
4
1.78
1
7
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The 1st treatment: Priming expectations. The current study used the same methods as
James (2011a) to prime either normative or empirical expectations of public services.
Participants in both the normative and empirical conditions were instructed to rate their
expectations of public services provided by their hometown local government. In the
normative condition, participants were instructed to rate their normative expectations of
public services, the idea of how often their hometown local government should
excellently perform (e.g., Should be excellent all the time; should be excellent most of the
time; should be excellent some of the time; should rarely be excellent; should never be
excellent). In the empirical condition, participants were instructed to rate their empirical
expectations of public services, their anticipation of how often their hometown local
government will excellently perform (e.g. Will be excellent all the time; will be excellent
most of the time; will be excellent some of the time; will rarely be excellent; will never be
excellent).
A total of four questions about expectations were asked concerning overall local
government performance, traffic signal management, street cleanliness, and sidewalk
management. The order of items was randomized to minimize bias from the question
sequence (Van de Walle & Van Ryzin, 2011). Therefore, there were two sequences of
randomization: first, showing whether the overall government performance or three
specific public services was randomized; next, presenting the order of specific public
services was randomized.
Cronbach’s alpha for the four items was 0.77, which indicates relatively high
internal consistency across four questions. Thus, the averaged expectation of the four
public services (M = 3.94, s.d. = 0.63) was used in this essay. A t-test was used to check
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whether participants formed different levels of construal depending on the priming of
normative or empirical expectations of public services. The participants who were primed
with normative expectations had a significantly higher average expectation (M = 4.20, s.e.
= 0.05) than the others who were primed with empirical expectations (M = 3.62, s.e. =
0.08; t(149) = – 6.40, p-value < 0.0001).
Measuring construal levels. This essay followed previous experiments that measured
construal levels through psychological distance (Liberman, Trope, Macrae, & Sherman,
2007; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). There has been extensive research that has empirically

demonstrated how construal levels are closely related to psychological distance (Fiedler,
2007; Freitas et al., 2008; Kim & John, 2008; Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002;
Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007; Mandel, 2003; Nan, 2007; Yaccov Trope & Nira
Liberman, 2010). The studies have consistently illustrated that a higher construal level
led people to think a subject is psychologically far from them; whereas, a lower construal
level led individuals to feel a subject is psychologically near them.
For this study, construal levels were measured in three dimensions of
psychological distance: temporal, social, and probabilistic distance. For temporal
distance, participants were asked to answer how soon the performance of their hometown
local government would meet their expectations for public services. For social distance,
participants were asked how closely connected they felt to their hometown local
government. Finally, participants were instructed to answer how likely the performance
of their hometown local government would meet their expectations. Compared to those
who form a lower construal level, individuals who were primed to hold a higher construal
level thought that their hometown local government would take a longer time and would
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be less likely to meet their expectations. Also, participants with a higher construal level
were psychologically less connected to their hometown local government than those
holding a lower construal level. Cronbach’s alpha for the three items measuring construal
levels was 0.61 5. The average construal level across the three items (M = 4.12, s.d. =
1.17) was used in this essay.
The 2nd treatment: Message orientations. Participants were randomly assigned to read
one of two vignettes. Both vignettes described three urban public services provided by
their local hometown government: management of traffic signal systems, street
cleanliness, and sidewalk management. In the ‘why’ message, the essay described the
desirability and purposes of providing the public services by their hometown local
government; ‘why’ their hometown local government would manage the traffic signal
systems, cleans streets, and manage sidewalks. In the ‘how’ message, the passage
illustrated the methods and strategies their hometown local government would use to
provide the public services; ‘how’ the local government would deliver the services. To
emphasize the effects of the messages, the phrases in the title and bullet points that
included ‘why’ or ‘how’ in the vignettes were written in bold.
Dependent variables: Citizen attitudes. After participants read the vignettes, they rated
their confidence, perceived importance, and trust in their hometown local government.
Also, their emotional valence, whether they feel positive or negative, toward their local
government was measured. Cronbach’s alpha for the four items measuring citizen
attitudes toward their hometown local government was 0.80, which indicates a high

5

Cronbach’s alpha for three items of psychological distance passes the recommended value of 0.6 for
exploratory studies in social sciences (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & L., 2006; Hinton, Brownlow,
McMurray, & Cozens, 2004)
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internal consistency across the four questions. Therefore, the average attitude toward
their local government (M = 5.15, s.d. = 1.06) was used in this essay. A t-test was used,
checking whether the type of expectations and message orientations form different levels
of citizen attitudes. There was no significant differences in citizen attitudes between
normative and empirical expectation groups (Mnormative = 5.15 and Mempirical = 5.14; t(149)
= -0.06, p-value = 0.95) and between ‘why’ and ‘how’ message orientation groups (Mwhy
= 5.11 and Mhow = 5.18; t(149) = 0.39, p-value = 0.70).
Control variables. Basic socioeconomic demographics were collected as control
variables. In addition to age, gender, and race, control variables included political
ideology (M = 2.98, s.d. = 1.19) ranging from 1, very liberal, to 5, very conservative.
Finally, at the end of the survey experiment, perceived performance (M = 4.04, s.d. =
0.89) of and satisfaction (M = 3.95, s.d. = 1.02) with their hometown local government
performance 6.
Results and Discussion
STATA 14, a statistical software package, was used to manage the data and
evaluate the hypotheses. A significance level of 0.05 was used for all statistical tests to
conclude whether the null hypotheses were rejected or not.
Table 2-2 illustrates descriptive statistics for Arms 1 to 4. Between-subject
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on control variables and participants’
sense of familiarity with public services to see whether there were significantly different

6

Individuals’ perceived performance of and satisfaction with local public services were excluded. Although
participants were asked to remember their perceived performance of and satisfaction with their local
government’s work before taking this survey, still there is the possibility that the treatments and other
survey questions shaping participants’ perceived performance of and satisfaction with public services,
which biases the results.
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features across groups. The control variables and participants’ sense of familiarity with
public services across the groups were not statistically different from each other at the 5%
significance level. In other words, results of significantly different results across groups
may not be driven from the control variables and sense of familiarity with public
services.

Table 2-2 Descriptive statistics of Arm 1-4
Variables

Normative Expectations
Why
How
Arm 1
Arm 3
38
45
4.21 (0.44) 4.19 (0.46)
4.21 (0.62) 4.09 (0.63)
4.47 (0.73) 4.49 (0.59)
4.08 (0.71) 3.96 (0.85)
4.08 (0.54) 4.22 (0.67)
4.30 (1.18) 4.30 (1.13)
5.03 (1.76) 4.87 (1.60)
4.03 (1.37) 3.84 (1.31)
3.84 (1.53)
4.18 1.47
5.09 (1.06) 5.21 (0.97)
5.53 (1.33) 5.71 (1.24)
4.5 (1.37)
4.8 (1.12)
5.68 (1.34) 5.69 (1.28)
4.63 (1.46) 4.62 (1.25)

Empirical Expectations
Why
How
Arm 2
Arm 4
31
37
3.61 (0.74) 3.63 (0.61)
3.52 (0.77) 3.62 (0.83)
3.90 (1.01) 3.78 (0.95)
3.52 (0.89) 3.59 (0.72)
3.52 (1.03) 3.51 (0.77)
3.89 (1.21) 3.90 (1.15)
4.42 (1.95) 4.24 (1.92)
3.52 (1.43) 3.73 (1.41)
3.74 (1.41) 3.73 (1.50)
5.14 (1.24) 5.14 (1.05)
5.65 (1.80) 5.46 (1.37)
4.68 (1.54) 4.81 (1.08)
5.61 (1.31) 5.51 (1.26)
4.61 (1.36) 4.78 (1.47)

Sample size
Expectations (average)
Overall gov. performance
Traffic signal
Street cleanness
Sidewalk management
Construal levels (average)
Social: closeness
Probability: likeliness
Time: Soon
Attitudes (average)
Confidence
Emotional valence
Importance
Trust
Control variables
Age
19.5 (2.96) 19.64 (2.26) 19.87 (3.14) 20.49 (7.95)
Gender (% of female)
0.39 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.84 (1.59) 0.76 (1.48)
Ideology
2.97 (1.30) 2.89 (1.23) 3.06 (1.12) 3.03 (1.12)
Perceived performance
3.92 (1.05) 4.02 (0.81)
4.26 0.89)
4 (0.82)
Satisfaction
3.82 (1.18) 3.82 (0.96) 4.19 (0.91) 4.05 (0.97)
Familiarity (average)
4.76 (1.41) 4.60 (1.53) 4.38 (1.67) 4.77 (1.55)
Traffic signal
5.24 (1.72) 5.02 (1.79) 4.71 (1.90) 5.08 (1.69)
Road condition
5.08 (1.65) 4.82 (1.71) 4.52 (1.95) 5.05 (1.60)
Sidewalk condition
3.97 (1.68) 3.93 (1.81) 3.90 (1.83) 4.19 (1.85)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
The descriptive summary was calculated based on the participants who successfully
completed the experiment.
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Model 1: Expectations and Construal Levels
The first hypothesis, whether normative expectations of public services bring a
higher construal level than that of empirical expectations, was supported by the meancomparison t-test and a linear regression model. A between-subject t-test was used to
compare construal levels in normative and empirical expectation groups. The participants
who were primed with normative expectations had a significantly higher average
construal level (M = 4.30, s.e. = 0.13) than the others who were primed with empirical
expectations (M = 3.90, s.d. = 0.14; t(149) = – 2.12, p-value = 0.036).
A linear regression model was used, which regressed construal levels based on the
type of expectations subjected to the control variables and the sense of familiarity with
public services. It is expressed as,
Model 1: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

where individual i’s construal level (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) was regressed on the conditions of

expectation types (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ), which were subjected to the control variables and the
sense of familiarity with public services (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ). When individual i was primed to hold

normative expectations of public services, t was equal to 1, and the treatment condition
became 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1𝑖𝑖 . On the other hand, when individual i was primed to hold

empirical expectations of public services, t was equal to 0, and the treatment condition
became 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁0𝑖𝑖 . The results of Model 1 are displayed in Table 2-3.
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Table 2-3 Regression models to test Hypothesis 1 and 2

VARIABLES

Expectation Conditions
(Normative = 1)
Message Orientations
(Why = 1)
Expectation*Message
Construal
Construal * Message
Expect Levels
Expect Levels
* Message
Age
Gender
Female
Declined to answer
Ideology
Ethnicity (White = 0)
Black
Asian
Native American
Hispanic
Decline/Don’t know
Familiarity

Model
1&3
Construal
(Eq1)

Model
2-1

Model
2-2

Attitudes

Attitudes

Expectation
(Eq 2)

Attitudes
(Eq 3)

0.35**
(0.18)
-

0.09
(0.23)
0.00
(0.26)
-0.20
(0.35)
-

1.13**
(0.50)
-0.32***
(0.08)
-0.30**
(0.13)
-

0.53***
(0.10)
-

0.31
(0.19)
-1.04
(1.45)
-0.38
(0.33)
-0.35***
(0.08)
-0.24*
(0.14)
-0.18
(0.20)

0.05***
(0.02)

-0.05
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.03***
(0.01)

0.54*
(0.30)
-0.02
(0.02)

-0.25
(0.17)
-1.00
(1.09)
-0.13
(0.09)

0.01
(0.17)
-0.04
(1.22)
0.16**
(0.08)

-0.09
(0.15)
-0.80*
(0.66)
0.12*
(0.07)

-0.02
(0.09)
-0.03
(0.28)
0.06
(0.04)

-0.04
(0.15)
-0.64
(0.76)
0.11*
(0.06)

0.52
(0.36)
0.22
(0.57)
1.19
(1.05)
0.28
(0.28)
1.09***
(0.40)
-0.26***
(0.06)

-0.45
(0.29)
0.08
(0.41)
-0.58
(1.30)
-0.11
(0.49)
-0.67
(0.76)
0.19***
(0.06)

-0.23
(0.28)
0.23
(0.32)
0.07
(0.69)
0.07
(0.49)
-0.02
(0.56)
0.07
(0.05)

-0.03
(0.16)
0.32
(0.22)
-0.50
(0.58)
-0.26
(0.18)
-0.13
(0.14)
-0.01
(0.03)

-0.31
(0.30)
0.18
(0.32)
0.43
(0.54)
-0.06
(0.50)
-0.13
(0.53)
0.07
(0.05)
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Model 3

Table 2-3 Regression models to test Hypothesis 1 and 2 (continued)

VARIABLES

Constant

Model
1&3
Construal
(Eq1)
4.63***
(0.50)

Model
2-1

Model
2-2

Attitudes

Attitudes

Expectation
(Eq 2)

Attitudes
(Eq 3)

4.75***
(0.70)

6.38***
(0.60)

4.20***
(0.23)

7.02***
(1.08)

Model 3

Observations
151
151
151
151
Adjusted-R2
0.219
0.155
0.391
0.315
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

151
0.416

Similar to the results from the t-test, the results of Model 1 also illustrated varying
levels of construal between the normative and empirical expectation groups. Participants
who were primed to hold normative expectations of public services tended to have a
higher construal level than those who were primed with empirical expectations of public
services. Interestingly, age and the sense of familiarity with public services had
significant relationships with construal levels. Construal levels tended to increase when
participants were older. The sense of familiarity had a negative relationship with
construal levels, which is consistent with previous studies (Förster, 2009). The more
participants felt familiar with the public services, the lower the level of construal they
experienced.
Discussion. The results suggest that people either holding normative or empirical
expectations of public services went through distinct cognitive processes that led to
varying degrees of psychological distance between themselves and their local
government. Participants who were primed to hold normative expectations tended to
think that they were less connected to their local government, and they thought that their
local government would take more time on services that were less likely to meet their
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expectations. The results could provide a clue to the results of James’ experiment (2011a)
that participants holding normative expectations of public services mainly used
information about good previous government performance, while individuals primed with
empirical (positive) expectations used information of both good and poor prior
government performance. One explanation for the results, based on the current
experiment, is that normative expectations made individuals focus on the desirability of
public services and the idea of the ‘excellent’ state of public services. This mental state
could lead them to consume information of good performance more readily than poor
previous government performance. On the other hand, empirical expectations might lead
individuals to consider situations and contexts of public service delivery, relaxing the
idea of ‘excellent’ government performance, and suggest that they might consider both
poor and strong government performance.
Model 2: Expectations, Message Orientations, Construal Levels and Attitudes
A 2-by-2 between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used on
participants’ attitudes toward their hometown local government. The ANOVA results
indicate that the second hypothesis, whether there is an interaction effect of expectations
and message orientations on attitudes toward their local government, was not supported.
There were no significant main effects of expectation types (F(1, 150) < 0.01, p-value =
0.97) and message orientations (F(1, 150) = 0.13, p-value = 0.72) on attitudes toward
their hometown local government. Also, there was no significant interaction between
expectation types and message orientation (F(1, 150) = 0.11, p-value = 0.74).
While controlling the socio-demographic factors and the sense of familiarity with
public services, two linear regression models were used to evaluate the relationships
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among expectations, message orientations, and attitudes. Model 2-1 includes the
treatment conditions of expectations and message orientations. Since the current study
hypothesized that the information about government performance would have different
relationships with citizen attitudes because of varying levels of construal, Model 2-2
included individual i’s construal level (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) instead of i’s conditions of
expectations. The models are expressed as,

Model 2-1: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

+ 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖

Model 2-2: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖

where individual i’s attitudes (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ) were regressed on the conditions of expectation
types (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ), message orientations (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ), and the interaction of both
(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ), which were subjected to the control variables and the
sense of familiarity with public services (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ). When individual i was primed to hold

normative expectations, t was equal to 1, and the treatment condition for expectations
became 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1𝑖𝑖 . Otherwise, when individual i was primed to hold empirical

expectation, t was equal to 0, and the treatment condition for expectations became
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁0𝑖𝑖 . For the treatment of message orientation, m, was equal to 1 when

individual i received ‘why’ message (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀1𝑖𝑖 ). When participants read ‘how’ their
local government delivered public services, m was equal to 0 (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀0𝑖𝑖 ).

Based on the results in Model 2-1, the second hypothesis is not supported. Similar

to the results of ANOVA, the treatment of expectation types and message orientations did
not have a significant relationship with attitudes toward hometown local government.
Ideology, however, had a significant relationship with attitudes toward the local
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government, meaning participants who thought of themselves as conservative were likely
to hold more positive attitudes toward their local government. Again, ones who felt more
familiar with the public services were inclined to report positive attitudes toward their
local government.
On the other hand, the results in Model 2-2 provides a different story from the
results in the ANOVA and Model 2-1. However, the results in Model 2-2 should be
interpreted with caution since there can be other ways to explain the results, such as
emotions, rather than just construal level theory. These other explanations are discussed
later. First, the results would be described regarding construal levels.
The results in Model 2-2 showed the significant main effects of construal levels
and message orientations about government performance, as well as the interaction
effects of the two on participants’ attitudes toward their hometown local government,
while controlling for other factors. Participants’ construal levels tended to have a
negative relationship with attitudes toward their hometown local government. Individuals
who tended to consider the desirability of public services and think in abstract ways were
likely to be less confident in, have less trust in, and have more negative attitudes toward
their local government than those who were inclined to consider the feasibility of public
services and think in more detailed terms. Participants who read ‘why’ their local
government delivered public services reported more positive attitudes to the local
government than those who read ‘how’ their local government provided public services.
Interestingly, the interaction between construal levels and message orientations
had a negative relationship with attitudes, which is against the second hypothesis. Figure
2-3. illustrated that the attitudes of the group who read the ‘why’ message became more
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negative as individuals’ construal levels increased compared to those who read the ‘how’
message. Initially, it was expected that people who hold higher construal levels would
form more positive attitudes toward their local government when they read the ‘why’
message than those who read the ‘how’ message, while people who experienced lower
construal levels would have more positive attitudes when they read the ‘how’ message
than those who read the ‘why’ message.

Figure 2-3. Fitted values and lines of attitudes based on Model 2-2

Discussion. Attitudes toward one’s hometown local government were not affected by the
treatments of expectation types and message orientation or by the interaction between the
two. However, their mental mechanisms and formed expectations induced by normative
and empirical expectations of public services seem to be related to their attitudes toward
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the local government. Construal levels had negative relationships with attitudes toward
one’s local government. People thinking in more abstract and holistic ways tended to
trust less in and be less confident with their local government. They thought their local
government was less important and felt less positive of their government performance.
However, this may be the case because of the items that measured construal
levels. For instance, the questions that measured psychological distance were how much
the participant felt connected to their local government and how soon and likely their
local government would meet their expectations. In the current essay, the higher construal
level participants had, the less they felt connected and the less they thought their local
government was likely to meet their expectations. Moreover, the higher construal level
they held, the more they thought their local government would need time to meet their
expectations. However, participants could feel bad when they feel distant from their local
government. As a consequence, the construal levels had negative relationships with
attitudes toward the local government.
Model 3: Construal Levels and Averaged Expectations as Mediators
Based on hypotheses 1 and 2, the current study expected that the levels of
construal and expectations might play a role as mediators. The first hypothesis expected
that normative and empirical expectations of public services would form different
construal levels. The second hypothesis assumes that the first hypothesis is true, and the
message orientations will bring different attitude levels because of different construal
levels. In addition, the degrees of expectations generated by the priming could influence
participants’ attitudes toward their local government (James, 2011a). Thus, construal
levels and expectation levels would mediate the effects of priming expectations. On the
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other hand, message orientations would moderate the relationship between priming
expectation types and attitudes, construal levels and attitudes, and expectation levels and
attitudes. Multiple linear regression models were used to fully evaluate Model 3 7. Hence,
Model 3 can be expressed as,
Eq 1) Mediator 1: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖

Eq 2) Mediator 2: 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀3𝑖𝑖
Eq3) Mediated-Moderation:

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
+ 𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛿𝛿𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀4𝑖𝑖

The dependent variables for Eq 1) and Eq 2) are mediators that individual i’s
construal levels (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ) and averaged expectation levels (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ) mediate the
relationships between the treatment of expectation types (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ) and individual

i’s attitudes toward the local government (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ). Socio-demographic factors and the
sense of familiarity of public services (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ) were controlled. Eq 3) expresses the role of

interactions in the model: the interactions between message orientation (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ) and
construal levels (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ), averaged expectation levels (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ∗

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ), and expectation treatments (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ).

7

A path analysis, which sets up paths among variables and uses observed variables instead of latent
variables, is used to evaluate mediation models. Its advantage is relaxing the assumption of multivariate
normality that a structural equation model has. However, a path analysis assumes homoscedasticity. It does
not apply the robust variance estimator that corrects heteroscedasticity. Since the method is not different
from running multiple linear regression models at the same time without applying the robust variance
estimator, the current study separately used linear regression models applying the robust variance estimator.
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In Table 2-4, the results in Model 1 are Eq 1). The results of Eq 2) suggest that
the averaged expectation levels were higher for those holding normative expectations of
public services than those holding empirical expectations of public services. Age had a
negative relationship with expectation level. The sense of familiarity with public services
did not have a significant relationship with the average expectation levels.
Eq 3) of Model 3 demonstrates interesting results. Similar to the results of Model
2-2, construal levels had negative relationships with attitudes toward hometown local
government. The more participants felt their hometown local government was further
away from them, the more negative attitudes toward the local government they reported.
There were marginally significant negative effects of the interaction between mental
representations and message orientations on participants’ attitudes toward their
hometown local government (p-value = 0.09). This goes against the second hypothesis
that people in a matching condition between mental mechanisms and the content of the
messages related to government performance would be likely to report more positive
attitudes toward their local government than those in a mismatch condition. Again,
compared to those who were primed with empirical expectations, attitudes of the
participants who were primed with normative expectations decreased at a higher rate
when the psychological distance increased with marginal significance.
Although the level of average expectation did not have significant relationships
with attitudes, there were positive effects of the interaction between averaged expectation
levels and message orientations. As Figure 2-4. illustrated, the effect of average
expectation levels on attitudes was different from the ‘why’ message group and the ‘how’
message group. Among the participants whose average expectation levels were low,
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participants in the ‘how’ message group tended to be more positive toward their local
government than those in the ‘why’ message group. On the contrary, among the
participants whose average expectation levels were high, the attitudes of the individuals
who read the ‘why’ message were more positive compared to those who read the ‘how’
message. Finally, the expectation treatments and message orientations did not have main
effects and interaction effects on attitudes.

Figure 2-4. The effect of interaction between expectation levels and message orientation
on attitudes

Discussion. Although it was the opposite of what was hypothesized, interestingly
psychological distance and message orientation interacted and marginally influenced
attitudes toward the local government. Also, average expectation levels induced by the
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expectation conditions and message orientations interacted and marginally affected
attitudes toward the local government. Compared to those who read the ‘how’ message
related to government performance, the slope that reflects the relationship between the
psychological distance and attitude, and between average expectation levels and attitude
was steeper among participants who read the ‘why’ message related to the provision of
public services. This means people’s attitudes toward their hometown local government
in the ‘why’ message group were more responsive to their psychological distance than
those in the ‘how’ message group. It is possible that the ‘how’ message provided
contextual settings that canceled out the effect of the ‘excellent’ condition of public
services. Moreover, the ‘why’ message may have assisted individuals in focusing on the
‘excellent’ conditions and their belief structure and made them compare current
conditions and excellent conditions.
Conclusion
This essay suggests that different types of information about the provision of
public services (‘why’ and ‘how’ messages) moderated the relationships between
different types of expectations (normative and empirical expectations) and attitudes
toward governments because of distinct mental mechanisms related to types of
expectations. Based on the between-subject t-tests, ANOVAs, and linear regressions, the
current study suggests that people hold different mental mechanisms depending on the
type of expectations related to public services. Such mental states can lead individuals to
differently understand and consume information related to public services and form
attitudes toward their government.
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There are several limitations of this essay. One is that it is not clear whether
construal levels played a role in forming attitudes toward governments. Although there is
a lot of empirical evidence of a close relationship between psychological distance and
construal levels, the three items assessing psychological distance that are supposed to
measure construal levels might not measure what was initially intended. Furthermore, the
questions themselves could prime individuals to have negative emotional valence toward
the government.
Another limitation concerns how individuals’ chronic tendencies of construal
levels, expectations, and attitudes toward their local government play out in the current
experiment. To minimize such influences, the current study randomly assigned
treatments, which made the treatments in this essay exogenous. However, since
expectations and attitudes are some components of belief structures that are built over a
period of time, along with experiences (Olson & Dover, 1976, 1979), these tendencies
could interact with the treatments and produce construal levels, levels of expectation
related to public services, and attitudes toward the local government. Also, people
intuitively make decisions and form attitudes toward political issues based on their
predispositions, such way of thinking and beliefs (Arceneaux & Vander Wielden, 2017).
Therefore, in future research, measuring and including prior expectation levels related to
government performance, construal levels, and attitudes toward governments without
affecting the treatment is necessary to deepen the understanding of dynamics among
expectations, construal levels, and attitudes.
In addition, in the current experiment, the relationship between the two mediators,
cognitive mechanisms and expectation levels cannot be determined. This study could not

39

demonstrate whether individuals’ mental states were first induced and then generated
expectation levels or vice versa. Also, both could be independent from each other, or they
may interact and influence attitudes toward a local government. Further evaluations of
the relationship between these two, and their effects on citizen attitudes toward a local
government, need to be studied to identify full causal relationships and to study how
individuals understand government performance. Uncovering these mechanisms could
provide potential interventions for public managers to more effectively communicate
with citizens.
Also, positive and negative feelings could play a role before the message
orientation treatment and influenced citizen attitudes toward governments. For instance,
people primed with normative expectations formed criteria related to the idea of excellent
condition. Then, they could compare the perceived quality of the public services to their
normative expectations and became unhappy with their government. On the contrary,
people primed with empirical expectations could be less likely to form criteria related to
the excellent condition of public services, compare, and become unhappy, since they
focus more on the feasibility of public. These emotional valences could interact with the
messages related to public services and influence attitudes toward governments.
Depending on the features of public services (e.g., political issues and saliencies),
expectations, and mental mechanisms, information related to public services may play
different roles in forming attitudes toward government performance. For instance,
political issues and policies that are highly polarizing and salient at a given time may tap
into ideologies, reflecting individuals’ strong beliefs. This may lead to different types of
expectations and mental states, forming individuals’ attitudes toward governments.
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Another approach to such a study is to consider public services provided by
different levels of government. The current study used local public services that people
would use daily. However, people might not know much about the services that were
provided by the federal government. Thus, the idea that people could easily picture
themselves using the local public services might have led people to hold a lower
construal level and be more responsive to the ‘why’ message than the ‘how’ message. On
the contrary, when dealing with public services provided by the federal government, the
‘how’ message might play a larger role than the ‘why’ message because the services are
more abstract and far away from them.
Nevertheless, with the limitations mentioned above, the current essay tried to
discover whether people have different ways of thinking when they focus on certain types
of expectations. Using an experimental research, this essay suggests causal relationships
among expectation types, construal levels, message orientations, and attitudes, adding a
relatively novel approach to examining citizen satisfaction. Analysis at the level of an
individual’s cognitive activities in particular could suggest how to manage citizens’
expectations better and communicate more effectively with citizens. Knowing which
thinking processes people go through may help predict what type of information could be
most effective in attaining desired outcomes.
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Chapter 3
Different Mind Sets, Different Evaluations of Government Performance: An
Experimental Test of Differences between Abstract and Concrete Thinkers in
Affecting Citizen Satisfaction with Government Performance

As governments have been stressing the importance of efficiency of public
programs and government accountability, performance evaluations of public programs
have become one of the main research interests among scholars in public administration.
However, measuring and evaluating the outcomes of government performance is difficult
(Wilson, 1989). One approach to evaluate the outcomes is to consider citizen satisfaction
with public services since citizen satisfaction serves as an indicator of the quality of
government performance (Van Ryzin, 2013) and the accountability of governments
(Hood, 1995; Kaboolian, 1998). To study citizen satisfaction with public services, a
series of studies has applied the expectancy-disconfirmation model, which suggests
citizen satisfaction with public services is closely related to the relative differences
between expectations and perceived performance of public services (James, 2009;
Morgeson, 2013; Petrovsky, Mok, & Leon-Cazares, 2017; Poister & Thomas, 2011; Roch
& Poister, 2006; Van Ryzin, 2004).
Furthermore, along with a movement that studies citizens attitudes toward
government performance at the micro-citizen level, some researchers have expanded the
model by assessing its antecedents, boundary conditions, and limitations of citizen
satisfaction studies (Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; Jacobsen et al., 2015) by applying the
theories of psychology to the public administration studies (Grimmelikhuijsen et al.,
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2017; Tummers et al., 2016). Likewise, this essay aims to assess boundary conditions
related to individual mental mechanisms. In other words, this paper suggests that people
holding distinctive cognitive mechanisms may consider different aspects of government
performance and reach different levels of satisfaction with such performance. Thus, an
experiment was conducted to examine the interactions between distinctive ways of
thinking and the dynamics among citizen expectations of, perceived performance of, and
satisfaction with public services.
One approach to consider the way individuals judge their satisfaction with public
services is to investigate how individuals construe a subject. Some people think in
abstract terms and consider the general ‘big picture,’ while others think in concrete terms
and focus on specific contextual factors. For instance, Liberman et al. (2002) suggest
construal level theory, which describes that people tend to understand a subject or an
event at different levels of abstractness. This indicates that people go through different
thinking processes depending on these levels. Combining construal level theory and the
expectancy-disconfirmation model will help scholars understand what aspects related to
government performance citizens focus on and how they evaluate the qualities of public
services via those focuses. Considering the mental mechanisms in citizen satisfaction
studies may further help researchers identify factors that moderate the relationships
among citizen expectations of, perceived performance of, and satisfaction with public
services.
The next section introduces the studies of citizen satisfaction that used the
expectancy-disconfirmation model. The following section explains construal level theory.
Afterward, the potential interactions between construal level theory and the expectancy-
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disconfirmation model are discussed. Then, the subsequent sections describe the
experimental design and results.
Citizen Satisfaction: Using the Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model
Understanding citizens’ perceptions of and attitudes toward government
performance have become important factors in public administration since citizens’ role
in the society has changed. Citizens are now considered as active consumers of public
services and collaborators in the co-production of public services with governments,
rather than simply passive service receivers. Therefore, inputs from citizens and their
attitudes, such as citizen satisfaction with government performance, are essential to
consider in the public sector.
Also, citizen satisfaction means more than an index of public service quality as
citizen satisfaction with government performance has close relationships with political
behaviors and other attitudes toward those governments. Based on satisfaction with
government performance, citizens would engage in political actions that are difficult for
government incumbents to ignore. For instance, dissatisfied citizens tended to punish
incumbents by voting against them (Boyne, James, John, & Petrovsky, 2009).
Dissatisfied citizens also were likely to exercise their ‘voice’ by complaining, protesting,
and engaging in collective actions to express their dissatisfaction with the public services
(Hirschman, 1970a; Lyons, Lowery, & DeHoog, 1992a). With the awareness of the
importance of citizen satisfaction in public administration, many scholars have used the
expectancy-disconfirmation model to study internal psychological mechanisms of citizen
satisfaction.
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Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model
The expectancy-disconfirmation model explains how people reach satisfaction
judgments as a result of three determinants: expectations of public services, perceived
performance of the services, and the difference between the two (Oliver, 1977, 1980,
2010b; Spreng, MacKenzie, & Olshavsky, 1996). People tend to have higher satisfaction
with public services when the perceived performance of public services meets or exceeds
their initial expectations of the services (positive disconfirmation), and they are likely to
be dissatisfied when perceived performance falls short of their expectations related to
public services. As the model was initially developed to examine consumer behavior
related to private goods, many scholars in public administration have tested the relevance
of the expectancy-disconfirmation model with public services provided by various levels
of governments (Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; James, 2009; Petrovsky et al., 2017;
Poister & Thomas, 2011; Roch & Poister, 2006; Van Ryzin, 2004, 2013).
An expectation of public services is an individual’s anticipation of the quality of
public services. It functions as a reference point in the model, which helps individuals
compare and evaluate services. Depending on the types of expectations that consumers
hold, it has mixed relationships with satisfaction with a service. For instance, normative
expectations have negative direct relationships with satisfaction (James, 2009; Poister &
Thomas, 2011), while empirical expectations have positive direct relationships with
satisfaction (Morgeson, 2013; Van Ryzin, 2004).
Perceived performance of government performance is consumers’ evaluation of
the service quality. Studies have illustrated the positive direct relationships between
perceived performance of public services with satisfaction with the services (Van Ryzin,
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2006, 2013). The relationship between expectations and perceived performance related to
government performance plays an essential role in the model. Disconfirmation, the
difference between expectations and perceived performance, determines satisfaction with
government performance (James, 2009, 2011b; Petrovsky et al., 2017; Van Ryzin 2013).
Individuals tend to be satisfied when the performance of public services exceeds their
expectations of the services (positive disconfirmation), while they are likely to be
dissatisfied when the performance does not meet their expectations (negative
disconfirmation).
Moreover, there is an emerging trend incorporating the concepts of cognitive and
social psychology in understanding the mechanisms of how citizens form expectations of
public services and evaluate government performance. In fact, the expectancydisconfirmation model is susceptible to heuristics (Andersen & Hjortskov, 2016; James,
2009), survey designs (Van de Walle & Van Ryzin, 2011), and priming effects
(Hjortskov, 2017). In other words, people are not free from their unconscious and
cognitive biases. Hence, studying how individuals’ mental mechanisms play a role in the
evaluation of public services is needed. Construal level theory, whether people think in
abstract or detailed terms could provide insights into the field of citizen satisfaction.
Mental Mechanisms to Consider: Construal Level Theory
There are diverse ways for understanding how individuals to think, consider, and
understand information related to subjects, actions, events, and their surroundings. In
fact, some people tend to focus on the ‘big picture’ or the forest, while some others are
inclined to consider details or the individual tree. Construal level theory explains that
people who think in abstract or detailed terms tend to think in different ways related to
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perceptions, actions, and judgments when confronted with stimuli that are close than
other stimuli that are distant from them (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Nira
Liberman, 2010).
Construal level refers to a mental frame (Liberman & Förster, 2009; Liberman et
al., 2002; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2010).
This explains that people in a higher construal level think about the ‘big’ picture and have
a ‘forest’ oriented mindset, and people in a lower construal level are ‘detailed-oriented’
and have an ‘individual tree’ oriented mindset. Individuals in a higher construal level are
inclined to focus on common general features among subjects, while others holding a
lower construal level are likely to focus on unique features of each subject (Liberman et
al., 2002). For instance, when a list of edible materials was provided to participants,
individuals who held a higher construal level tended to categorize them as ‘food.’ On the
other hand, those in a lower construal level were inclined to categorize them as ‘meals,’
‘snacks,’ or ‘drinks.’
Construal level theory is closely related to individuals’ goal-orientations. For
instance, varying levels of construal lead individuals to consider distinct aspects of
actions (Liberman & Trope, 1998). People in higher construal levels consider the goal
and desirability of an action. For example, these citizens think about why governments
provide public services. On the contrary, people in lower construal levels consider the
contexts of service delivery and the feasibility of the action. Citizens who understand
things in concrete-terms think about how governments provide public services.
Also, construal levels are related to ones’ sensitivity to surrounding contexts
(Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2010). On average, higher construal levels led individuals to
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be goal-oriented. Thus, they tended to control themselves and followed a plan to achieve
their goals. Lower construal levels tended to drive people to consider about their
situations, to be less goal-oriented, and to diverge from a plan. In other words, people in a
higher construal level would be less susceptible to the contexts and situations they would
be in and focus on the goal more so than those in a lower construal level.
In addition, several studies have suggested the possibility of close relationships
between individuals’ construal level and satisfaction. Goodsell (2004) observed that
citizens who experienced a service tended to be more satisfied with public services than
citizens without such experience. Since people were likely to form lower construal levels
for familiar things than for new stimuli (Förster, 2009), the results of Goodsell’s study
(2004) suggest that users become more satisfied with services that they are familiar, and
they process their experiences with these services through lower levels of construal. In
other words, citizens reach different levels of satisfaction with public services because
they have evaluated and judged the services in different ways.
Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model and Construal Level Theory
This essay proposes that the distinct thinking processes by construal levels
moderate the dynamics among citizens’ expectations, perceived performance, and
satisfaction with public services. Construal levels may affect expectations. People with a
higher construal level may become goal-oriented and form their expectations about
public services (a reference point) while considering the desirability of the services. For
instance, a higher construal level can lead individuals to think of what government
performance should be. Although individuals have different ideas about the ideal role of
public agencies, citizens tend to have a clear and stable belief about how well
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governments should perform. On the contrary, people holding a lower construal level
may build expectations of public services based on the contextual factors and focus on
the feasibility of services, which may lead them to have varying levels of expectation of
government performance. Thus, the hypotheses related to expectations of public services
are,
H1a: Participants primed to have a higher construal levels will have higher
expectations of public services than those primed to hold a lower construal level;
H1b: The variance in expectations of people primed to hold a higher construal
level will be lower than those of the others primed to have a lower construal level.
In addition, citizens’ perceptions of government performance could systematically
vary between high and low levels of construal (Liviatana, Trope, & Liberman, 2008;
Trope & Liberman, 2010). In a higher construal level, people tend to evaluate others’
performances based on the core features of service outcomes, like the high quality of
government performance that improves citizen life satisfaction. Since it is difficult to
achieve a high quality of public services, people are likely to judge government
performance as low. Contrarily, at a lower construal level, people may assess others’
work based on peripheral features of public services, such as the circumstantial
conditions of service deliveries, and would be sufficiently satisfied by the provided
public services. Citizens who think the contexts of public service delivery, such as
economic depressions, challenges the governments to provide the services would form
less negative attitudes toward government performance because there is a relevant reason
for governments to perform less than expected. Since people in a lower construal level
tend to factor in contexts and their experiences when making judgments related to

49

government performance, which vary from individual to individual, the variance of
perceived performance of individuals in a lower construal level will be greater than those
in a higher construal level. Thus, the second hypotheses were,
H2a: Participants primed to have a higher construal level will report lower
perceived performance of public services than those primed to hold a lower
construal level;
H2b: The variance of perceived performance of participants primed to have a
higher construal level will be smaller than those of those primed to hold a lower
construal level.
Based on the first and second hypotheses, I expected that the disconfirmation of
perceived performance and expectations would differ from the higher to the lower
construal level conditions. Since I expected that people who were primed to have higher
construal levels would have higher expectations, it is more likely for their perceived
performance to fall short and lead to little or even negative disconfirmation. On the other
hand, the perceived performance of people who were primed to hold lower construal
levels could have a range of disconfirmations since they were more likely to factor in
situations and their experiences. Thus, the third hypotheses were,
H3a: The mean of disconfirmation will be lower for the higher construal group
than the lower construal group;
H3b: The variance of disconfirmation will be smaller for the higher construal
group than the lower construal group.
By combining construal level theory and the expectancy-disconfirmation model, I
expected distinct relational patterns among the expectations, perceived performance, and
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satisfaction depending on the construal levels that individuals had at the time. Thus, the
fourth hypothesis to test was,
H4: The construal levels will moderate the relationships among expectations,
perceived performance, and satisfaction with public services.
Experimental Design and Measurements
This essay is one of the first pieces of research to assess the role of mental
representation in citizen satisfaction with government performance. The experiment
compared two groups of participants who were primed to hold either a higher or a lower
construal level. Figure 3-1. illustrates the procedure of the experiment. To help
participants to engage in the experiment, they were instructed that the survey was about
the performance of their hometown local government.
A control condition, neither priming a higher nor a lower construal level, was not
included for two reasons. First, the purpose of this essay was to examine the different
patterns in citizen evaluation processes of government performance, rather than
estimating the absolute estimation of the treatment effects. Another reason was that not
priming a construal level does not necessarily mean people have a middle level of
construal. The measured construal level might reflect individuals’ chronicle tendency of
construal levels or some unknown information in the primed message.
Also, following previous research (Kim et al., 2009; Liberman, Trope, Macrae, et
al., 2007; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), this paper primed construal levels and measured
those primed construal levels through manipulating and measuring individuals’
psychological distance to the website operated by their hometown local government. The
previous studies have consistently demonstrated the close relationship between construal
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levels and psychological distance in the dimensions of time, social, probability, and
physical distance (Fiedler, 2007; Freitas et al., 2008; Kim & John, 2008; Liberman et al.,
2002; Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007; Mandel, 2003; Nan, 2007; Trope & Liberman,
2010). For instance, a lower construal level (detailed thinking) is associated with the
sense of being psychologically near, whereas a higher construal level (abstract thinking)
is linked with the sense of being psychologically distant.
General procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to two groups. The vignettes
were about launching a website rub by their hometown local government where citizens
could report the defects of their community to their local government. One group was
informed that the website was planned to be launched ‘a year later’ (higher construal
condition) whereas another group read that it was already launched (lower construal
condition). Since the treatment was exogenous, the mean and variance differences in the
averaged psychological distance are highly likely to be caused by the treatment.
After reading the vignettes, participants’ construal levels were measured. Then,
their expectations of, perceived performance of, and satisfaction with the public services
were measured. Also, participants’ age, gender, ideology, and race were included as
control variables at the end of the study. For more detailed measurements, see Table A
B1 in Appendix B.
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Invite respondents and randomly assign (N = 49)
: One agreed to participate but did not continued the study

Measure the trust in government and the sense of familiarity
with public services (N = 48)
: Management of traffic signal systems, sidewalks, and street cleanness
Arm 1 (N = 22)
Message
(Higher construal condition)
: Will be launched in Next year

Arm 2 (N = 26)
Message
(Lower construal condition)
: Is Now provided

Measure construal level with psychological distance (N = 45)
: Three participants in Arm 2 did not continue
Measure Expectations, Perceived Performance, & Satisfaction (N = 42)
: One participant in Arm 1 did not continue after answering construal
levels
: One participant in Arm 2 did not continue after answering expectations
: One participant in Arm 2 did not continue after answering perceived
performance
Socio-Demographic Control Variables (N = 42)
Figure 3-1. The experimental design to test the expectancy-disconfirmation model and
the construal model. This figure illustrates the general procedure of the experiment.

Participants. I recruited students enrolled in Applications of Statistics in Psychology
(PSY 216-009), Abnormal Psychology (PSY 333-001), and Senior Thesis Research (PSY
496-001) for the 2018 spring semester at the University of Kentucky. Forty-nine students
were initially recruited, and seven did not finish the experiment. Thus, 42 participants
were included in the analysis. Table 3-1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of all the
variables.
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Participants were randomly assigned to either the higher construal condition or
the lower construal condition; there were 21 participants for each condition. The groups
included 33 females 8 (19 in the high construal condition and 14 in the low construal
condition), 7 males (2 in the high construal condition and 5 in the low construal
condition), and 2 individuals declined to answer in the high construal condition. There
were 34 white 9 students (16 in the high construal and 18 in the low construal condition)
and 8 non-white students (3 in the high construal and 5 in the low construal condition).
There was no significant difference in age, ideology, trust in government, or the sense of
familiarity between the high construal and the low conditions.
Measurements: Trust and familiarity. This essay controlled for individuals’ trust in
government, which might have relationships with citizen satisfaction or perceived
performance related to government performance. Also, the sense of familiarity with
public services, which might have relationships with their construal levels, was controlled
for. Participants were asked to rate the level of their trust and familiarity with public
services via a 7-point Likert scale. The sense of familiarity with the traffic signal systems,
road conditions, and sidewalk conditions was separately measured.
Cronbach's alpha for the three items measuring the familiarity with public
services was 0.83, suggesting high internal consistency. Thus, an index was created that
averaged the three items and used the averaged familiarity with public services to test the
hypotheses.

8

Based on a one-tailed t-test, the high construal condition had significantly higher proportion of females
compared to those of the low construal condition (t = -1.92; p-value = 0.03). The difference was marginally
not significant in a two-tailed t-test (p-value= 0.06).
9
The proportion of white students in each condition were not significantly different based on a two-tailed ttest (t = 0.77; p-value = 0.44).
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Manipulation check: Construal levels. After instructing participants to read a vignette,
there was a check to see whether the treatment manipulated their construal levels.
Participants answered how soon they thought the website would start and how likely they
would download the website via a 7-point Likert scale. Another item, asking how many
times they would report defects in the community through the website was recorded with
an 11-point Likert scale. Since the scales were in different ranges, the ratings for each
item were transformed into z-scores. Compared to the group primed to hold a lower
construal level, participants holding a higher construal level would report that the website
would start later, they would be less likely to download the website, and would be less
likely to report defects through the website.
Cronbach’s alpha for the items measuring how much they were likely to
download the website and to report defects through the website was 0.75, which indicates
relatively high internal consistency 10. Thus, the index for construal levels was created by
averaging the standardized scores of individuals’ likely to download and frequencies of
reports.
Expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction. Because of the small sample
size, the order of blocks and the items presented within each block were not randomly
presented. All participants rated their expectations of public services, followed by
reporting perceived performance of the services, and finally they judged their satisfaction
with the services provided by their hometown local government via 7-point Likert scales.
Within each block, the order of the items started from the overall quality of public

10

Cronbach’s alpha for the three items that measure construal levels was 0.50, which is lower
than the rule of thumb, 0.60 (Hair et al., 2006; Hinton et al., 2004). However, excluding the item that
measures how soon they think the program will be launched increased Cronbach’s alpha to 0.75.
Thus, the item reflecting the temporal dimension of psychological distance was not included.
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services, traffic signal systems, road conditions, and sidewalk conditions. The sample
size of 42 participants was not large enough for randomization to cancel out the noise.
With small sample size, randomizing the order of questions would introduce noise that
would decrease a chance to detect meaningful patterns.
Disconfirmations were calculated as the ratings of perceived performance of
public services minus those of expectations that align with each public service. For
instance, the disconfirmation between the perceived performance and expectations of
road conditions was calculated as the perceived performance level of road conditions
minus the expectation levels of road conditions. A positive disconfirmation means
perceived performance exceeds expectations, whereas a negative disconfirmation means
perceived performance fell short of expectations.
Control variables: Socio-demographic characteristics. Age, gender, ethnicity, and
ideology were measured as control variables. Gender and ethnicity were included as
dummy variables. Female was coded as 1 and male and non-reporters as 0. Self-reported
white individuals were coded as 1 and all others as 0. Individuals’ ideology was
measured in a 5-point Likert scale, from 1, very liberal, to 5, very conservative.
Methods
To test whether the manipulation induced different levels of construal, the
standardized construal level was regressed upon the treatment condition and other control
variables. The averaged familiarity of public services was included in the regressions.
The model for this was,
Model 1: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + +𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
56

Where an individual i was asked to answer questions related to public services (ps), such
as the overall quality of public services, traffic signal systems, road conditions, and
sidewalk conditions. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is whether a person i received the treatment to hold a

higher or a lower construal level. When a person i read the vignette that their hometown
local government would launch a website a year later, t is equal to 1 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,1 ).

When a person i read the vignette that their hometown local government just now
launched the website, t is equal to 0 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,0 ).

To test whether the distinct relational patterns among expectations, perceived

performance, and satisfaction related to public services based on the high construal to the
low construal condition, I regressed satisfaction on the condition dummy variable and the
interactions between condition and expectations and between condition and
disconfirmation. The coefficients of interaction terms reflect the distinct patterns of
relationship depending on the treatment. The model was,

Model 2:
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

+𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

+𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
+𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

Since I expected that the different relational patterns would exist because of
different construal levels primed by the treatment, the level of construal was included in
the models instead of the treatment conditions. Thus, the model was,
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Model 3:
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

+𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

+𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

+𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

If different relational patterns based on the treatment conditions and the construal
levels exist, the interaction terms, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 in Model 2 and Model 3, would be
significantly different from zero.

Results
Table 3-1 illustrates the results of the manipulation check. The treatment of the
vignettes did not have significant relationships with construal levels. In other words, the
treatment was not effective enough or it was insufficient to make a difference in
individuals’ construal level. Another possible explanation is the three items measuring
psychological distance might fail to measure individuals’ construal level 11. Instead,
individuals’ ideology had marginally significant relationships with their psychological
distance related to the website, p-value ranging from 0.019 to 0.09. Except for the time
dimensions of psychological distance, the more people were conservative, the more
distant they felt related to the website.

11

Since it is ambiguous what the index created from participants’ psychological distance related to the
website means, this essay interprets the results in terms of psychological distance instead construal levels.
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Table 3-1 Manipulation check: Regress psychological distance on the treatment and
control variables
Psychological
Likely to
Variables
Time
Report
Distance
Download
Condition
-0.01 (0.30)
0.17 (0.35)
-0.25 (0.31)
0.23 (0.38)
Familiarity
0.10 (0.09)
-0.05 (0.09)
0.12 (0.09)
0.08 (0.10)
Trust in Gov.
-0.17 (0.16)
0.11 (0.22)
-0.02 (0.16)
-0.32 (0.20)
Age
0.07 (0.09)
-0.03 (0.11)
0.06 (0.09)
0.07 (0.11)
Female
-0.36 (0.37)
0.11 (0.37)
-0.43 (0.45)
-0.29 (0.36)
Ideology
0.38** (0.15)
-0.32* (0.19)
0.35** (0.15)
0.40* (0.22)
White
-0.57 (0.35)
0.39 (0.50)
-0.90** (0.36)
-0.24 (0.43)
Constant
-1.07 (1.77)
0.57 (2.06)
-1.31 (2.00)
2
Adjusted-R
0.887
0.102
0.208
* p-value < 0.10; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01

-0.83 (2.02)
0.194

To discover whether there were significant mean and variance differences
between the psychologically distant and near groups, the two-tailed t-test was used to test
the mean differences, and Levene’s robustness test (Levene, 1960) was used to evaluate
the variance differences. The mean and variance differences in expectations, perceived
performance, disconfirmations, and satisfaction about public services are illustrated in
Table 3-2.
All the means were not significantly different from the psychologically distant
group to the psychologically near group, except the disconfirmation of the overall quality
of public services. People who were primed to feel distant from the website tended to
have a positive disconfirmation, while those primed to feel near to the website were
likely to have a negative disconfirmation. However, on average, the expectations of the
overall quality of public services and their satisfaction with sidewalk conditions were
significantly higher for the psychologically distant group than the psychologically near
group, based on the one-tailed t-test.
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Another way to test whether the mean and variance of individuals were different
depending on the psychological distance related to the website was creating a dummy
variable based on the actual psychological distance to the website individuals already
had. Thus, the dummy variable was coded as 1 when the standardized psychological
distances were over 0, and all otherwise were coded as 0. Twenty participants were
categorized as psychologically distant, and 22 were categorized as psychologically near.
There were no significant mean differences in expectations of public services, but people
feeling distant from the website had a larger variance related to the overall quality
(Varhigh = 1.55; Varlow = 0.91; p-value = 0.02). There were no significant mean
differences in perceived performance of public services, but people feeling distant from
the website had a smaller variance related to the sidewalk conditions (Varhigh = 1.10;
Varlow = 1.70; p-value = 0.02). Related to disconfirmations, compared to individuals
feeling near to the website, participants feeling distant from the website had positive
disconfirmation related to traffic signal systems (Mhigh = 0.00; Mlow = -0.77; p-value =
0.04). Related to the overall quality of government performance, people feeling distant
from the website marginally had a larger variance than those feeling near to the website
(Varhigh = 1.19; Varlow = 0.79; p-value = 0.08). In general, the third hypotheses were not
supported.

Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics and mean and variance comparisons between the
conditions
Distant
Near
Two-tailed
Variables
Total
Condition
Condition
p-values
Trust in Gov.
4.67
4.81
4.52
0.34
(0.95)
(0.75)
(1.12)
Familiarity
4.68
4.57
4.79
0.65
Averaged
(1.56)
(1.52)
(1.63)
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Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics and mean and variance comparisons between the
conditions (continued)
Distant
Near
Two-tailed
Variables
Total
Condition
Condition
p-values
Traffic signal
4.83
4.86
4.81
0.94
(2.11)
(1.96)
(2.29)
Road
4.86
4.71
5.00
0.57
(1.59)
(1.65)
(1.55)
Sidewalk
4.36
4.14
4.57
0.42
(1.71)
(1.56)
(1.86)
Construal level
0.01
0.02
0.003
0.96
Averaged (z-score)
(0.90)
(0.85)
(0.97)
Temporal (z-score)
-0.09
-0.04
-0.13
0.77
(0.96)
(0.97)
(0.98)
Likelihood (z-score)
0.03
-0.06
0.12
0.57
(1.00)
(0.92)
(1.09)
Report (z-score)
-0.01
0.10
-0.11
0.52
(1.01)
(1.00)
(1.04)
Expectations
4.55
4.90
4.19
0.07*
Overall
(1.27)
(1.18)
(1.29)
(0.80)
Traffic signal
5.24
5.38
5.10
0.46
(1.23)
(1.24)
(1.22)
(0.85)
Road
4.64
4.81
4.48
0.43
(1.34)
(1.44)
(1.25)
(0.38)
Sidewalk
4.36
4.52
4.19
0.47
(1.48)
(1.40)
(1.57)
(0.56)
Perceived performance
4.79
4.67
4.90
0.42
Overall
(0.95)
(0.91)
(1.00)
(0.39)
Traffic signal
4.83
4.71
4.95
0.57
(1.34)
(1.35)
(1.36)
(0.88)
Road
4.33
4.52
4.14
0.29
(1.14)
(1.12)
(1.15)
(0.95)
Sidewalk
4.36
4.71
4.00
0.11
(1.45)
(1.42)
(1.41)
(0.92)
Satisfaction
4.60
4.76
4.43
0.26
Overall
(0.94)
(0.70)
(1.12)
(0.10)*
Traffic Signal
4.79
4.71
4.86
0.73
(1.32)
(1.19)
(1.46)
(0.35)
Road
4.36
4.57
4.14
0.30
(1.32)
(1.25)
(1.39)
(0.41)
Sidewalk
4.48
4.86
4.10
0.07*
(1.35)
(1.20)
(1.41)
(0.60)
Disconfirmation
0.24
0.71
-0.24
0.00***
Overall
(1.01)
(0.96)
(0.83)
(0.98)
Traffic signal
-0.40
-0.14
-0.67
0.16
(1.21)
(0.73)
(1.53)
(0.04)**
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Table 3-2 Descriptive statistics and mean and variance comparisons between the
conditions (continued)
Distant
Near
Two-tailed
Variables
Total
Condition
Condition
p-values
Road
-0.31
-0.33
-0.29
0.90
(1.16)
(1.20)
(1.15)
(0.90)
Sidewalk
0.00
-0.19
0.19
0.34
(1.29)
(1.44)
(1.12)
(0.95)
Sociodemographic
19.90
19.90
19.90
1.00
Age
(1.65)
(1.79)
(1.55)
Gender (Female)
0.79
0 .90
0.67
0.06
(0.42)
(0.30)
(0.68)
Ethnicity (White)
0.81
0.76
0.86
0.44
(0.40)
(0.44)
(0.36)
Ideology
2.26
2.43
2.10
0.23
(0.89)
(1.08)
(0.62)
* p-value < 0.10; ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01
p-values in parentheses indicates the significance of differences between variances of
the psychologically distant and near group. The values are based on Levene’s robust
test statistics.

The results of Model 2 and Model 3 are displayed in Table 3-3. The dependent
variables, participants’ satisfaction with the four aspects of government performance,
were treated as continuous variables. In Model 2, there was a significant treatment effect
on satisfaction with the overall quality of public services, but not others. Participants who
were assigned to read that the website would be launched a year later were 2.64 units
more satisfied in a 7-point Likert scale than those who read that the government program
was already launched. In Model 3, there were mixed results related to the relationships
between psychological distance and satisfaction with public services. The standardized
psychological distance had negative relationships with satisfaction with the overall
quality of public services and traffic signal systems. The further distance from the
website individuals felt, the less satisfaction with the overall quality and traffic signal
systems they reported. On the other hand, in terms of the road conditions, there was a
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significant positive relationship between the psycholgical distance and satisfaction. The
closer to the website participants felt, the more satisfied they were with the road
conditions.
In general, disconfirmations, which were perceived performance minus
expectations of public services, were positively related to satisfaction with government
performance, supporting the expectancy-disconfirmation model. The higher people rated
perceived performance than their expectations of public services, the more satisfied with
the public services they were. In Model 2, when the expectations were fixed, the
satisfaction with the overall quality and road conditions increased by 0.62 and 0.92 for
each, as the ratings of perceived performance increased by a unit. In Model 3 testing of
the effects of standardized psychological distance, the satisfaction with the traffic signal
system and road conditions increased by 0.66 and 0.84 of each, as perceived performance
increased by one unit.
The results related to the relational patterns based on the treatment condition and
the psychological distance indicates the role of the treatments and the mental mechanisms
in the expectancy-disconfirmation model. Related to the overall quality of public
services, the treatment marginally moderated the relationships between expectations and
satisfaction and between disconfirmation and satisfaction at the 10-percent significance
level. Compared to individuals who were primed to feel near to the website, participants
who were primed to feel distant from the website experienced a lesser effect of
expectations and disconfirmation on satisfaction with overall qualities of public services.
On average, the effect size of expectations of overall government performance was 0.27
for participants in the distant-message group, but 0.78 for those in the near-message
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group. The effect size of disconfirmation related to overall government performance was
-0.21 for the distant-message group, but 0.62 for the near-message group. In other words,
the satisfaction of the people in distant-message group decreased even when the
perceived performance exceeded expectations.
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Table 3-3 OLS models, treating satisfaction as continuous variables
Overall Quality
Traffic Signal
VARIABLES
Model 2
Model 3
Model 2
Model 3
Condition Construal Condition Construal
Condition (HC = 1)
Psy. Distance
Expectations
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Condition
* Expectations
Psy. Distance
* Expectations
Disconfirmation
Condition
* Disconfirmation
Psy. Distance
* Disconfirmation
Familiarity
Trust in Gov.
Age
Female

2.64**
(1.26)
0.78***
(0.23)
-0.51**
(0.25)
0.62**
(0.30)
-0.83*
(0.41)
0.07
(0.09)
0.29
(0.18)
-0.02
(0.07)
0.07
(0.33)

-1.41**
(0.62)
0.44***
(0.12)
0.30**
(0.13)
0.14
(0.15)
0.31
(0.30)
0.06
(0.08)
0.36**
(0.15)
-0.03
(0.08)
-0.08
(0.32)

1.14
(1.01)
1.07***
(0.10)
-0.25
(0.20)
0.26
(0.19)
0.40*
(0.22)
-0.13
(0.12)
0.13
(0.16)
-0.14
(0.09)
0.20
(0.22)

-1.13**
(0.55)
1.00***
(0.08)
0.24**
(0.11)
0.66***
(0.11)
0.14
(0.23)
-0.10
(0.11)
0.16
(0.19)
-0.16*
(0.09)
0.08
(0.30)

Road Condition
Model 2
Model 3
Condition
Construal
-0.15
(1.39)
0.94***
(0.24)
0.05
(0.30)
0.92***
(0.24)
-0.29
(0.36)
-0.06
(0.09)
-0.00
(0.17)
-0.11
(0.07)
-0.47
(0.29)

1.35***
(0.49)
1.06***
(0.10)
-0.27**
(0.11)
0.84***
(0.14)
-0.19
(0.15)
-0.08
(0.07)
0.26*
(0.15)
-0.14*
(0.08)
-0.14
(0.28)

Sidewalk Condition
Model 2
Model 3
Condition
Construal
-0.45
(0.80)
0.51***
(0.17)
0.21
(0.19)
0.54
(0.35)
-0.15
(0.36)
-0.03
(0.14)
-0.25
(0.25)
0.13
(0.10)
-0.21
(0.51)

-0.14
(0.76)
0.64***
(0.13)
0.09
(0.17)
0.51*
(0.27)
-0.25
(0.24)
-0.09
(0.16)
-0.14
(0.27)
0.06
(0.10)
-0.00
(0.58)

Table 3-3 OLS Models, treating satisfaction as continuous variables (continued)
Overall Quality
Traffic Signal
Road Condition
VARIABLES
Condition Construal Condition Construal
Condition
Construal
Ideology
-0.08
-0.18
0.04
-0.09
-0.13
-0.12
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.15)
(0.13)
(0.12)
White
0.08
0.16
-0.33
-0.27
-0.26
-0.11
(0.37)
(0.36)
(0.35)
(0.33)
(0.29)
(0.30)
Constant
-0.40
1.50
2.33
3.17*
3.57*
2.13
(1.86)
(1.61)
(1.78)
(1.85)
(1.88)
(1.42)
Observations
42
42
42
42
2
Adjusted-R
0.555
0.546
0.776
0.764
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

42
0.751

42
0.786

Sidewalk Condition
Condition
Construal
0.14
0.07
(0.14)
(0.17)
0.11
0.05
(0.39)
(0.35)
0.54
1.26
(1.80)
(1.44)
42
0.600

42
0.626
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The psychological distance significantly moderated the relationship between
expectations and satisfaction with public services except for sidewalk conditions. The
effect sizes of expectations on satisfaction increased by 0.30 for the overall quality of
public services and 0.24 for traffic signal systems, but they decreased by 0.27 for road
conditions when the standardized psychological distance increased by one standard
deviation. There were no significant moderation effects of the standardized psychological
distance on the relationship between disconfirmation and satisfaction.
Control variables did not have significant effects on satisfaction except trust in
government in the model that tested the relationship between the construal levels and
satisfaction with overall qualities. The more individuals trust their hometown local
government, the more they are satisfied with the overall qualities of public services.
Discussion and Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to test whether distinct mental images bring about
different relational patterns among expectations, perceived performance, disconfirmation,
and satisfaction with government performance based on the expectancy-disconfirmation
model. The concept of construal levels, thinking in abstract or detailed terms, was used to
predict distinct relational patterns among key variables. Based on the results of regressing
construal levels on the treatment, the treatment unsuccessfully manipulated participants’
construal levels. Instead, individuals’ ideology had significant relationships with the three
items measuring psychological distance. When people were more conservative, they
reported that the government website would be launched sooner (having lower construal
levels), they would be less likely to download the program (having higher construal

67

levels), and they would be less likely to report defects through the program (having
higher construal levels).
Overall, the results support the expectancy-disconfirmation model. Expectations
and satisfaction with public services were positively related, meaning higher expectations
lead people to have higher satisfaction. Also, disconfirmation and satisfaction had
positive relationships. People who thought government performed better than what they
expected tended to have higher satisfaction. As Oliver (1977, 1980) suggested,
expectations functioned as reference points for individuals’ comparison of evaluation of
service qualities and satisfaction.
Although there were no treatment effects on psychological distances related to
the website and satisfaction with public services, except for the overall quality of
government performance, the results suggest that the distinct ways of thinking played
significant roles in the relationships among expectations, perceived performance,
disconfirmation, and satisfaction related to public services. In particular, psychological
distance had significant relationships with expectations. As psychological distance related
to the website increased, the effect sizes of expectation on satisfaction with the overall
quality of public services and traffic signal systems increased, whereas the effect sizes of
expectations on satisfaction with road conditions decreased. In other words,
psychological distance led people to think in different ways, which eventually affected
satisfaction. Thus, this study demonstrated the initial stage of evidence that mental
mechanisms might play an important role when people judge government performance.
There are limitations to this essay. First of all, the sample size was too small to
randomize items within each block (asking participants’ expectations, perceived
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performance, and satisfaction related to government performance) to test the hypotheses.
Compared to the number of parameters tested in the models, a small sample size brings
low statistical power (Button et al., 2013) and higher rates of Type 1 error (Forstmeier,
Wagenmakers, & Parker, 2017). Thus, the results presented in this essay should be
interpreted with caution.
Another limitation is related to the experimental design. Although the results
indicate close relationships between psychological distance and expectations, it is
possible that the experimental design measuring psychological distance before asking
participants’ expectations of public services might cause the psychological distance to
affect expectations. Therefore, answering the questions made individuals aware of how
far for close they feel related to the government operated website. However, in the realworld setting, psychological distance and construal levels may not have significant
relationships with expectations. A model was run that treated the sense of familiarity with
public services as individuals’ chronic tendency of construal levels since the sense of
familiarity can be treated as an indicator of construal levels (Förster, 2009). The level of
familiarity with public services did not moderate the effects of expectations and
disconfirmation on satisfaction.
Another possibility is that the items, which were designed to measure construal
levels after the treatment, were not reflecting construal levels. There were no significant
relationships between familiarity and construal levels. The item, how likely the individual
will be to download and use the website, might reflect the level of individuals' active
participation in their community instead of their construal levels. On the other hand, the
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item might reflect how much individuals believe in their power to change their
community through participation.
Nevertheless, this essay suggests the potential role of distinctive mental
mechanisms in evaluations of government performance. The psychological distance
measures used in this paper seem to have a close relationship with expectations.
However, there may be omitted variables, such as individuals’ beliefs related to the
consequences of their actions or civic behaviors, which need to be considered in future
studies.
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Chapter 4
A Proposed Non-Linear Relationship of Satisfaction with Government Performance
and Co-Production and an Initial Empirical Test

Scholars and government officials have realized that the efficiency and
effectiveness of public services inherently and heavily rely on citizens’ collaborative
behavior with governments’ production of public services, i.e., co-production. Thus,
many public institutions encourage citizens to participate in the process of decisionmaking and producing public services (Brandsen, Pestoff, & Verschuere, 2012),
recognizing the benefits of the inputs from both professionals and citizens (Normann,
1984; Ramirez, 1999). The benefits are improved quality and increased quantities of
public services that citizens can consume, which enhances the efficiency of providing
public services (Jakobsen, 2013; Ostrom, 1996; Thomsen, 2015). Since public managers
and institutions can encourage citizen participation in the production and provision of
public services, it is essential to know who is likely to co-produce public services with
governments and why.
In accordance with the emphasis on collaborations between citizens and officials
in the provision of public services, some scholars have focused on the relationships
among individual characteristics, psychological factors, and co-production. For instance,
some studies demonstrated variables that had significant relationships with coproduction, such as individuals’ ability to co-produce and knowledge related to coproduction (Alford, 2002), self-efficacy (Thomsen, 2015), and attitudes toward
government performance (Bovaird et al., 2015; Parrado et al., 2013). Although
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researchers have recently recognized the need for empirical approaches to study citizen
behavior in the provision of public services, there is still limited empirical research on
citizen co-production. Thus, this paper mainly focuses on the relationship between citizen
attitudes toward government performance and co-producing behavior.
The goal of this paper is to suggest a model that evaluates the relationship
between citizen attitudes (i.e., satisfaction with government performance) and citizen coproduction behavior. In detail, to evaluate the relationship between citizen satisfaction
with government performance and co-production, a model is developed by drawing on
the expectancy-disconfirmation model and the framework of prospect theory. The
expectancy-disconfirmation model is a citizen satisfaction model that assesses the
dynamic among expectations of, perceived performance of, and satisfaction with
government performance. Prospect theory explains how individuals use heuristics when
they make decisions under certain conditions. This paper is a starting point for thinking
about who engages in co-production of public services and why they decide to coproduce with public officials.
In the next section, the concept of co-production and related existing studies are
introduced. The following section discusses limitations of previous co-production
research: little attention has been given to citizen satisfaction and its connection with coproduction. Next, prospect theory and the expectancy-disconfirmation model are
reviewed. The following section develops a model that integrate the logic of the two
theories. Based on the model, a potential non-linear relationship between citizen
satisfaction and co-production is tested using the US data. Finally, the results and further
research opportunities are discussed.

72

Co-production and Citizen Attitudes Toward Governments
There have long been efforts by scholars in public administration to reach an
agreed upon definition of citizen co-production. It is typically defined as the
collaboration between public agents and citizens in which both contribute their resources
to increase the quantity and improve the quality of public services (Brudney & England,
1983; Ostrom, 1996; Parks et al., 1981). Here, citizens are voluntary participants in the
process of public service production and active consumers of public services, rather than
compelled compliers because of the punishments by regulations and passive receivers of
public services.
Many scholars agree that co-production creates public value for citizens,
communities, and societies. Co-production is considered as an approach to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of public services without significant increases in the costs
of providing such services (Jakobsen & Andersen, 2013; Marschall, 2004; Osborne,
Radnor, & Strokosch, 2016). For instance, students' school performance improved among
those whose parents participated in school activities. Furthermore, co-production
enhances government accountability (Ostrom, 1996), social capital (Alford, 2002), and
the sense of citizenship and democratic governance (Dunston, Lee, Boud, Brodie, &
Chiarella, 2009). With the recognition of the benefits of co-production, many countries,
especially in Europe, have been incorporating co-production into their social policies and
implementing the policies in various ways (Künzel, 2012; OECD, 2011). Hence, to
effectively encourage citizens to co-produce public services together with public
officials, knowing who co-produces is crucial to increasing the benefits of co-production.
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However, who co-produces and how they co-produce depend on the
characteristics of co-production activities. Since co-production is multi-dimensional,
some scholars in public administrations have introduced typologies of co-production and
demonstrated individual characteristics that are closely related to co-production. For
instance, many studies used the typology of co-production developed by Brudney and
England (1983). Their typology subdivides co-production into individual, group, and
collective co-production based on the degree of inputs to and benefits from co-production
activities. Among empirical studies, some found the individual citizens’ factors (i.e., the
sense of self-efficacy, attitudes toward government performance and information about
co-production activities, and socio-demographic characteristics of citizens) had
distinctive relationships with their co-production behavior at individual and collective
levels (Bovaird et al., 2015; Parrado et al., 2013).
Although co-production has been widely applied in the public sector by public
managers, surprisingly there are still relatively few quantitative studies (Brandsen &
Honingh, 2016; Voorberg, Bekkers, & Tummers, 2013). This is especially the case
concerning the behavioral aspects of relationships between citizen attitudes toward
government performance and citizen co-production. Several studies have evaluated the
links between citizen attitudes and co-production and found a negative association
between them (Bovaird et al., 2015; Parrado et al., 2013). In fact, citizens who were
dissatisfied with government performance were more likely to co-produce. For instance,
if one thinks the government performs well enough to protect the community, one may
feel less obligated to pay attention to their surroundings and less likely to participate in a
group patrolling the neighborhood. On the other hand, if one thinks the government is not
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doing a good enough job protecting the community, one may feel more responsible for
watching their neighborhood or attending the Citizen Police Academy. However,
previous studies evaluated a linear relationship between citizen satisfaction with
government performance and co-production, and they have paid limited attention to how
and under what conditions citizens decide to co-produce public services.
To empirically study who co-produces public services and how they reach a
decision to co-produce, this essay connects citizens’ satisfaction with government
performance and citizen co-producing behavior. Also, this study develops a model that
incorporates the expectancy-disconfirmation model (Oliver, 1977, 1980) and the insights
from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). Prior studies have suggested
the link between the two theories (Oliver, 2010a; Roch & Poister, 2006). The connection
between the two theories will be explained in more detail after the brief introduction of
the expectancy-disconfirmation model and the framework of prospect theory.
The Link between the Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model and Prospect Theory
Among many factors that encourage or discourage citizens to co-produce public
services, citizen satisfaction with government performance needs to be considered in
citizen co-production studies for several reasons. First, citizen satisfaction with
government performance is closely related to political and civic behavior. For instance,
citizens who were dissatisfied with government performance were likely to punish
political incumbents by voting against them (Boyne et al., 2009) and ‘voice’ their
dissatisfaction (Hirschman, 1970b; Lyons, Lowery, & DeHoog, 1992b). Bovaird et al.
(2015) found that citizen evaluations of government performance had a negative
relationship with co-production. In a democratic society, this can later lead to questions
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about the legitimacy of a government. If the government, which is elected by citizens to
represent them, repeatedly fails to perform what citizens ask, the government will lose
authority and validity to govern. Hence, evaluating how satisfied and dissatisfied citizens
co-produce is important.
However, there are few quantitative studies about the role of citizen satisfaction
with government performance in co-production behavior. Furthermore, there are limited
studies about citizen co-production that apply descriptive and behavioral approaches.
Many behavioral theories proposes that citizens’ attitudes toward the government may
not linearly transform into behavior, and it is hard to predict behavior based on attitudes
(Corey, 1937; LaPiere, 1934).
In this essay, I suggest a potential non-linear relationship between citizen
satisfaction and co-production by combining the expectancy-disconfirmation model and
the prospect theory framework. Also, this paper is part of a broader agenda to apply the
prospect theory framework in public sector settings (Baekgaard, 2017; Moynihan &
Lavertu, 2012; Vis & van Kersberge, 2007). In the next section, I introduce the
expectancy-disconfirmation model and prospect theory. Then, I present a new model that
incorporates the two and suggests a non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction
with public services and citizen participation in co-production.
Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model
Among researchers who study citizen satisfaction with government performance,
some use the expectancy-disconfirmation model to examine the key determinants and
causal relationships among the variables (James, 2009; Morgeson, 2013; Petrovsky et al.,
2017; Poister & Thomas, 2011; Van Ryzin, 2004, 2006). The expectancy-
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disconfirmation model was originally developed by Oliver (1977, 1980) to study the
behavior of satisfied or dissatisfied consumers. The model explains the cognitive
mechanisms of how individuals reach satisfaction once they consume a service or a
product. The main contribution of the expectancy-disconfirmation model is to emphasize
the role of expectations in consumer satisfaction.
Usually, many people think that the higher the quality of public services, the more
individuals are satisfied, which is true in some degree. Surprisingly, there are cases in
which citizens are dissatisfied with the good quality of public services or in which they
satisfied with the poor performance of public services. The expectancy-disconfirmation
model suggests perceived performance of public services does not linearly transform into
satisfaction with the services because of expectations (Oliver, 1977). In this model,
expectations of services function as criteria for individuals to compare perceived quality
of public services. Therefore, individuals tend to be satisfied with public services when
the perceived performance of the services exceeds expectations related to such services.
On the other hand, citizens are likely to be dissatisfied with public services when the
perceived performance of the services falls short of expectations. Thus, satisfaction with
services is a function of the differences between expectations and perceived performance.
Among the studies connecting citizen attitudes and co-production, some have
found a negative linear relationship between citizen satisfaction with government
performance and citizen co-production behavior (Bovaird et al., 2015; Parrado et al.,
2013). However, based on the framework of prospect theory, there are theoretical reasons
for a non-linear relationship between citizen co-production behavior and citizen
satisfaction with government performance.
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Prospect Theory Framework
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) developed the ground-breaking prospect
theory that later became a primary foundation of behavioral economics. The theory
explains decisions by individuals with bounded rationality when uncertainty and risk are
involved. It is a descriptive theory that illustrates how individuals make decisions using
heuristics, instead of how individuals make optimal decisions as normative theories
suggest. Prospect theory has three rules related to people’s decision-making under
uncertain situations: sensitivity to relative losses and gains, loss aversion, and
diminishing sensitivity. The three rules will be explained after introducing the basic
structure of prospect theory.
First of all, understanding the structure of prospect theory is important, illustrated
in Figure 4-1. The horizontal line shows the level of outcomes that individuals will
receive as a result of their decisions. The vertical line is the level of value (utility) that
they feel from the outcomes they receive. The intersection of the horizontal and vertical
line is a reference point. A reference point is a default condition that functions as a
standard. The right side of the reference point illustrates the outcomes that will add to
individuals’ default level of outcomes, meaning they will gain based on their decisions.
The left side of the reference point implies that the outcomes will deduct from
individuals’ default level of outcomes, meaning they will lose based on their decisions.
Values above the reference point reflects how much individuals value from the gains
(positive utility), and below the reference point indicates how much people dislike the
losses (negative utility).
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Figure 4-1. The value function from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984)

The crucial contribution of prospect theory is the S-curve, which is drawn based
on the three descriptive rules. The first rule, sensitivity to relative losses and gains, means
that people make decisions based on how much they relatively will gain or lose from
their default (a reference point), rather than considering the absolute level of endoutcomes. Thus, the S-curve goes through the reference point, where individuals are in a
neutral state. The second rule, loss aversion, means that individuals tend to react to the
loss situation more than the gain situations. In other words, people strongly dislike a
given loss more than they like the same amount of gain. Thus, the S-curve is asymmetric:
there is a much steeper in slope in the loss area than the gain area. Finally, the third rule,
diminishing sensitivity, indicates that the further away from the reference point people
are, the less sensitive to an additional loss or gain. In the graph, the slope of the curve
reflects sensitivity to gains and losses, with a steeper curve meaning that individuals are
more sensitive to gains and losses. Thus, the levels of value increase for a gain and
decrease for a loss near the reference point. However, the sizes of value-increase for
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gains and the value-decrease for losses diminish when additional gains and losses happen
far away from the reference point. Thus, the slope of the S-curve is steep near the
reference point, and the slope gets flatter as the S-curve moves further away from the
reference point.
Combining the Expectancy-Disconfirmation Model into the Prospect Theory
Framework
The framework of the value function from prospect theory can be used to explain
citizen satisfaction since both models explain similar psychological processes individuals
experience in decision-making. First, both models emphasize the role of criteria. Criteria
are expectations in the expectancy-disconfirmation model (Oliver, 2010b) and reference
points in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). Second, the expectancydisconfirmation model explains that satisfaction is a function of the relative difference
between expectations and perceived performance of services like the relationships among
the reference point, losses and gains, and value levels (Oliver, 2010a; Roch & Poister,
2006). Finally, the expectancy-disconfirmation model has empirically demonstrated that
people were more sensitive to negative situations than to positive situations (James,
2009). This is similar to loss aversion suggested by prospect theory. Compared to
satisfied citizens, citizens dissatisfied with public services were more responsive to the
difference between expectations and perceived performance of services. Based on these
similarities between the expectancy-disconfirmation model and the prospect theory
framework, I incorporate the key variables of the expectancy-disconfirmation model (i.e.,
expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction) into the prospect theory
framework.
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The logic of the expectancy-disconfirmation model, that people are likely to be
satisfied when performance meets or exceeds their expectations but to be dissatisfied
when perceived performance falls short of expectations, can be expressed as,
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 )

(1)

where citizen 𝑖𝑖’s satisfaction with the public service 𝑗𝑗 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), is determined by individual

𝑖𝑖’s expectations of the service 𝑗𝑗 (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), perceived performance (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), the disconfirmation of
expectations and perceived performance (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), and other covariates of individual i (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 )
and public service j’s characteristics (𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ).

Below, Figure 4-2. shows the proposed new model, combining the key variables

of the expectancy-disconfirmation model and the prospect theory framework. The
horizontal line is the quality level of public services or government performance citizens
perceive. It is the citizens’ perception of the quality of public services that they consume
or they expect. The vertical line shows the level of satisfaction with public services
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ). The intersection of the horizontal and vertical lines is the perceived quality of

public services (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) that citizen consumed. The S-curve follows the rule of loss aversion

and diminishing sensitivity. Expectations of public services (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) are located where the S-

curve and the horizontal line meets.
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Satisfied

Perceived
performance
(Lower/worse)

(Higher/better)
Expectation

Level of Perceived
Government Performance

Dissatisfied

Figure 4-2. A new model that incorporate the expectancy-disconfirmation model into the
prospect theory framework

Furthermore, Figure 4-3. shows satisfied and dissatisfied citizens. The S-curve on
the left represents a citizen who is satisfied with public services. For instance, person A’s
perceived quality of public services (where the vertical and horizontal lines intersect, 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 )
is higher than person A’s expectations (𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ) of the services, meaning 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 > 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 . Thus,

person A is satisfied with what governments provide (where person A’s S-curve meets
the vertical line, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ). On the contrary, the S-curve on the right represents a citizen who
is dissatisfied with public services. Person B’s perceived quality of public services
(where the vertical and horizontal lines intersect, 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ) is lower than person B’s

expectations (𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ) of the services, meaning 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 < 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 . Thus, person B is dissatisfied

with what governments provide (where person B’s S-curve meets the vertical line, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ).
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Figure 4-3. Comparing satisfied and dissatisfied cases

The Relationship between Citizen Satisfaction with Public Services and Citizen CoProduction
Let’s say that both person A and person B equally participate in co-production
and improve the quality of public services, from the level of 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 & 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 to the level of 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 .

With improved quality of public services, both person A’s and person B’s satisfaction

increases. In this paper, the relationship between citizen satisfaction and co-production is
expressed as,
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔(∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 )

(2)

where citizens 𝑖𝑖 decides to co-produce (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) depending on their expected changes in

satisfaction with the improved public service 𝑗𝑗 (∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) through their co-production, along

with other covariates of the individual 𝑖𝑖 (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ) and public services characteristics 𝑗𝑗 (𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 ). The

expected changes in individuals’ satisfaction are the differences between citizen
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satisfaction with government performance before their co-production and after their coproduction [∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � − 𝐸𝐸�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �~𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �]. In other words, people will decide

to co-produce to improve government performance and expect their satisfaction level will
increase.
However, the size of increase in satisfaction varies. As Figure 4-3. depicts, person

B’s satisfaction level increases more than that of person A’s. In other words, dissatisfied
citizens (person B) have more motivation to participate in co-production than satisfied
citizens (person A) since dissatisfied citizens obtain more psychological benefits from coproduction than satisfied citizens (∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 > ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ). Thus, the first hypothesis to test is,

H1: Dissatisfied citizens will be disproportionately more likely to co-produce than
neutral and satisfied citizens.
In addition, the third rule of prospect theory, diminishing sensitivity, provides

new insights into the relationship between citizen satisfaction with public services and
citizen co-production behavior. Diminishing sensitivity, becoming less sensitive to the
changes further away from the reference point, suggests that people who are moderately
dissatisfied and satisfied will behave differently from those who are very dissatisfied and
satisfied. Citizens, in the extreme, might be less motivated to co-produce because they
are receiving less psychological benefits from their activities, compared to those who are
in the moderate range of satisfaction with public services. Thus, the second hypothesis is,
H2: There will be a non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction and coproduction in that moderately dissatisfied and satisfied people are more likely to coproduce than those in the extreme.
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Assumptions. This paper builds the model and hypotheses based on several assumptions.
One is that co-production and perceived performance of public services (or expected
future perceived performance) have a positive relationship. People will expect that their
collaboration and cooperation with their government will improve the quality of public
services. The second assumption is that people can predict how their satisfaction will
increase based on the expected improved quality of public services. Based on the
proposed model, the expected improved performance will, in turn, lead people to expect
higher satisfaction when the expectations are constant. Finally, the expected changes in
satisfaction and co-production have monotonic direct relationships. The more individuals
expect larger increases in satisfaction as a result of their co-production, the more they are
willing to co-produce. The proposing non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction
with government performance and co-production is based on Equation (1) and expected
changes of satisfaction (∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) are based on Equation (2). The expected changes of

citizen satisfaction follow the framework of prospect theory.

Another assumption of this paper is that citizens are aware of the benefits of coproduction, and they are willing to co-produce to enjoy those benefits. One of the
important issues in citizen co-production is public-good problems, such as free-riding. In
reality, not everybody wants to co-produce in the provision of public services since it is
costly to do such activities. Individuals have to spend their time and efforts when they
participate in decision-making and collaborating with others. In particular, the tendencies
to free-ride, enjoying the benefits from others’ co-production efforts, make the problem
worse (Olsen, 1965; Pestoff, 2012). Ostrom (2000) suggested that the social system, such
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as social norms and beliefs in others’ contributions and the existence of punishments for
free-riders, could encourage and discourage citizens’ participation in co-production.
Although the cost of co-production for citizens, social norms and free-riding are
important issues to address, they are beyond the scope of this paper. To proceed, the
assumption is that the level of benefits is independent of the costs, in order to focus on
the benefits of co-production.
Data
To test the hypotheses, this paper uses a sample collected in 2014 of United States
residents. Parrado et al. (2013) and Bovaird et al. (2015) studied co-production at the
individual level in European countries. However, it is important to know how U.S.
citizens co-produce at the individual level since the administrative culture and political
system are different from the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom.
The data was collected from June 26th to July 6th in 2014 in the United States
through AmericasBarometer studies (source http://www.AmericasBarometer.org). A
multilevel probabilistic design and stratification methods were applied based on regions,
municipality size, and rural and urban areas within municipalities. One person per
household who was eligible to vote participated in the survey. People who were
institutionalized in prison, a boarding school, or a hospital, were not included.
The descriptive statistics for individuals’ socioeconomic demographics are
summarized in Table A C 1 and Table A C 2 in Appendix C. The number of observations
to test the hypotheses is 548, based on 753 observations in the survey version measuring
satisfaction, of which 136 observations are missing because either their children did not
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attend school, did not use health services, or both in the past 12 months at the time they
took this survey. There are an additional 69 missing values from the main and control
variables.
Methods
This essay creates indices for the dependent and explanatory variables. The items
were selected for the variables based on the results of Cronbach’s alpha and principal
component factor analysis with orthogonal rotation. The process is described in detail in
Table A C 3 in the Appendix. In addition, see Table A C 4 in the Appendix C for detailed
summary statistics for co-production, citizen satisfaction, and trust in political
institutions. Tables 4-1 reports the descriptive summaries for co-production, citizen
satisfaction with public services, trust in political institutions, and approval of president’s
work.
The dependent variable is co-production, which is measured by whether the
respondents attended meetings as a form of citizen participation in the provision of public
services. Attending meetings is considered as co-production because meetings cover
aspects of all four dimensions of co-production (APSE, 2013; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006;
Bovaird, 2007; Bovaird & Löffler, 2010; Weinberger & Jütting, 2001). Through
attendance, individuals can prioritize policies and public services (co-commissioning),
discuss improvement in the public services (co-design) based on their experiences and
evaluations (co-assessment), and learn how to use the services (co-delivery)
appropriately. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for attending a municipal or
parents’ association meeting at least once. There are 321 observations (58.58%) who
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never participated in a meeting and 227 observations (41.42%) who attended at least one
meeting.
The main explanatory variable is citizen satisfaction with public services. Citizen
satisfaction is an additive index of the ratings of individual satisfaction with public
services in five areas: satisfaction for the democracy in the state and the quality of police
performance, roads, public school services, and health services. The satisfaction with the
US democratic system is included since it reflects individuals’ “support for the way the
democratic regime works in practice” (Linde & Ekman, 2003). The additive index of
citizen satisfaction ranges from 5, very dissatisfied with all five domains, to 20, very
satisfied with all five domains. Furthermore, a dummy variable for dissatisfaction is
created. Based on the neutral state which is the middle of the satisfaction range from
level 5 to level 20, the dummy variable is coded as 1 for dissatisfied or very dissatisfied
people whose satisfaction rating is lower than neutral level or 12.5, while it is coded 0 for
people whose satisfaction rating is greater than 12.5. The questions that measure coproduction and citizen satisfaction are listed in Appendix C Table A C 4.
Control variables are trust in political institutions and socioeconomic
demographics. An index for trust in political institutions is created by averaging six items
(see Table A C 3 in Appendix). Citizen attitudes toward the government are controlled
since individuals’ perceptions of government performance have a positive relationship
with co-production (Bovaird et al., 2015). In this paper, only individuals’ perceived
performance of President Obama is available that reflects individuals’ attitudes toward
the government. Other socioeconomic variables are included, such as age (Bovaird et al.,
2015), gender (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005), education level (Egerton, 2002), and
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working status (Wilson & Musick, 1997). Other demographic variables, such as marital
status, the number of people in one’s household, monthly income level, religion, race,
regional areas, ideology, partisanship, are included as well.

Table 4-1 Descriptive statistics of co-production and citizen satisfaction
Variables

Mean

Linearized
SD

Co-production

0.42

0.06

Citizen satisfaction

13.27

0.14

Dissatisfaction

0.35

0.01

3.65

0.14

3.22

0.09

Trust in political
institutions
Approval of President’s
work

Min

Max

0
Never
5
Very
dissatisfied
0
Satisfied
1
Not at all
1
Not at all

1
Co-produce
20
Very
satisfied
1
Dissatisfied
7
A lot
7
A lot

Results
Two models were used to test the hypotheses. Model 1 tests whether there is
negativity bias by including the dummy variable for dissatisfaction. Model 2 evaluates
whether there is a negative quadratic relationship between citizen satisfaction and coproduction by including a quadratic term for citizen satisfaction. The results are reported
in Table 4-2. Since this essay is exploratory, the interest is in the direction of
relationships, not in testing causation.
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Table 4-2 The results of Model 1 and Model 2
Model 1
Variables
Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Satisfaction
Satisfaction Squared
Trust in political institutions
Approval of President's work
Age
No. of people in household
Female
Marital Status (Single)
In a relationship
Widowed & Separated
Monthly Income ($2,720 or less)
Middle: $2,721 - $5,325
High: $5,326 or more
Education (high school or less)
College
Post Graduate
In Labor Force
Ideology
Partisanship (Others)
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Religion (Catholic)
Protestant
No-religion
Others
Ethnicity (White)
Black
Hispanic
Others
Areas (West)
Midwest
Northeast
South
Constant

Model 2
Quadratic

-0.28*** (0.08)
0.07 (0.06)
-0.15* (0.08)
0.00 (0.00)
0.13* (0.07)
0.17 (0.12)

0.18*** (0.05)
-0.01** (0.00)
0.08 (0.07)
-0.16 (0.08)
0.00 (0.00)
0.12* (0.07)
0.16 (0.12)

0.17 (0.13)
0.39*** (0.12)

0.15 (0.12)
0.39*** (0.11)

-0.06 (0.11)
0.15 (0.15)

-0.07 (0.12)
0.15 (0.14)

0.04 (0.18)
0.47* (0.23)
0.15* (0.16)
0.07 (0.04)

0.05 (0.18)
0.48* (0.24)
0.14 (0.16)
0.08* (0.04)

0.04 (0.28)
-0.14 (0.33)
0.11 (0.27)

0.02 (0.28)
-0.16 (0.32)
0.09 (0.27)

-0.02 (0.11)
-0.04 (0.18)
-0.23 (0.15)

-0.03 (0.11)
-0.04 (0.17)
-0.25 (0.16)

0.49 (0.32)
0.34 (0.37)
0.08 (0.44)

0.5053 (0.312)
0.3146 (0.364)
0.0819 (0.427)

-0.41** (0.14)
-0.22 (0.16)
0.03 (0.12)

-0.41** (0.14)
-0.24 (0.15)
0.01 (0.12)

-1.21* (0.61)

-2.66*** (0.70)

Observations
548
548
Linearized standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The first hypothesis – that people dissatisfied with the public services will coproduce more – is not supported. People who are dissatisfied with the public services
were less likely to co-produce than the people who are satisfied with it. The results from
Model 2 suggests that citizen satisfaction and co-production had a negative quadratic
relationship. In other words, being in a certain range of citizen satisfaction will increase
the probability of individuals to co-produce. However, after a certain point of the level of
citizen satisfaction, an increase in citizen satisfaction decreases the probability of citizen
participation in co-production. The estimated point of highest probability or 0.46 is at
16.4 satisfaction level in which the negative of the linear coefficient divided by twice the
quadratic coefficient, about 0.1801/0.0110, with a standard error 2.88. In other words,
with 95% probability the range of satisfaction level from 10.78 to 22.06 contains the true
population value of maximum probability of co-production.
The main focus of this paper is to observe the variability in the probability of coproduction relative to citizen satisfaction. However, certain values need to be assigned to
other control variables to predict the probability. There are two ways to determine the
values. The most common way is to calculate the means over the total sample for each
control variable and predict the relationships between dependent and explanatory
variables. However, this may not reflect the characteristics of the sample used in this
essay since the subgroups for a given level of satisfaction may have different
characteristics from each other. The second method addresses this issue by using the
mean of other covariates conditional on satisfaction levels. In this case, the estimated
probability of co-production arises from citizen satisfaction or from changes in other
variables which are correlated with satisfaction. The estimated probability of co-
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production is reported in Table 4-3, first with unconditional means and the second with
means conditional on satisfaction.
For convenience, Table 4-3 and Figure 4-4 show the estimated probability of coproduction at the points of citizen satisfaction with public services holding others at
means (see Table A C 5 in Appendix C for means of margins for total observations and
subpopulations). Figure 4-4. A and C show the margins while other variables are fixed at
averages of total observations. The margins in Figure 4-4. B and D are estimated based
on the characteristics of subpopulations of satisfaction. For example, to estimate the
margin for 'satisfied' in Figure 4-4. B, the estimated margins of the probability of coproduction are based on the means of the covariates of the 353 observations who are
'satisfied.' Thus, the estimated margins in Figure 4-4. C and 4-4. D reflect the actual data
better than the Figure 4-4. A and C.

Table 4-3 Predicted probability of co-production under the condition of citizen
satisfaction for Model 1 and Model 2
Variables
Model 1: Dissatisfied
Not Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Model 2: Quadratic
Very Dissatisfied 5
Satisfaction 6
Satisfaction 7
Satisfaction 8
Satisfaction 9
Satisfaction 10
Satisfaction 11
Satisfaction 12
Satisfaction 13
Satisfaction 14
Satisfaction 15

Unconditional
Means

Conditional Means

Each Subgroup
Observations

0.46*** (0.03)
0.35*** (0.01)

0.49*** (0.03)
0.30*** (0.02)

353
195

0.21*** (0.04)
0.24*** (0.04)
0.28*** (0.03)
0.31*** (0.03)
0.34*** (0.02)
0.37*** (0.01)
0.40*** (0.01)
0.42*** (0.01)
0.43*** (0.02)
0.45*** (0.03)
0.45*** (0.03)

0.14* (0.07)
0.32*** (0.09)
0.20*** (0.03)
0.12*** (0.02)
0.21*** (0.04)
0.33*** (0.03)
0.36*** (0.02)
0.40*** (0.03)
0.42*** (0.02)
0.42*** (0.01)
0.48*** (0.04)

3
3
9
12
25
44
47
52
85
85
85
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Table 4-3 Predicted probability of co-production under the condition of citizen
satisfaction for Model 1 and Model 2 (continued)
Unconditional
Each Subgroup
Conditional Means
Means
Observations
Satisfaction 16
0.46*** (0.05)
0.61*** (0.05)
35
Satisfaction 17
0.46*** (0.06)
0.55*** (0.07)
34
Satisfaction 18
0.45*** (0.07)
0.70*** (0.09)
13
Satisfaction 19
0.44*** (0.08)
0.52*** (0.07)
12
Very Satisfied 20
0.43*** (0.10)
0.64*** (0.11)
4
Linearized standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4-4. Predictive probability of co-production under the condition of citizen
satisfaction with 95% confidence intervals
Adjusted Wald tests were conducted to evaluate whether there were differences
across the margins and reported in Table 4-4. For Model 1, the estimated margins
between dissatisfied and satisfied people are significantly different for both unconditional
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mean and conditional mean estimates (F(1, 11) = 44.23; p-value < 0.0001). Similar trends
are shown in both the total-sample estimation and the subpopulation condition. In the
total sample condition, the estimated probability of co-production for satisfied citizens is
0.46 which is significantly higher than 0.35 for dissatisfied citizens. Estimated margins
for subpopulation conditions illustrate that the predicted probability of co-production for
353 of satisfied citizens is 0.49, which is higher than that of probability for 195 of
dissatisfied citizens, 0.30.
For Model 2 with unconditional mean estimates, the probability of co-production
increases as the levels of satisfaction increases until level 13 of satisfaction. The
probability co-production increases from 0.21 at the level 5 of satisfaction to 0.43 at level
13 of satisfaction. In Table 4-5, the probability increases at a decreasing rate until level
13 of satisfaction. However, there are no significant changes after level 13 of satisfaction.
In the Model 2 with conditional subpopulation mean estimates, the probability of coproduction at the extremes of satisfaction are turbulent since their sample sizes for each
level of satisfaction are less than 15 observations. Thus, the statistical significances
displayed in Table 4-4 needs to be considered with caution. Although the changes in the
probability of co-production are not clear as the estimated probability with unconditional
mean estimates, the probability of co-production increases from 0.12 at the level 8 of
satisfaction to 0.61 at the level 16 of satisfaction. The trends of the predicted probabilities
of co-production for unconditional and conditional means estimates are similar as in
Figure 4-4. C and D. Overall, the estimated margins based on Model 2 suggest that the
probability of co-production increases as satisfaction increases at a decreasing rate and
there is no evidence of change at the extremely high satisfaction.
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Table 4-4 Comparing the predicted probability of co-production at each citizen
satisfaction level using adjusted Wald test
Estimated probability
of co-production
Model 1: Dissatisfied
Satisfied vs.
dissatisfied

Unconditional means
Former Latter Difference
(1)
(2)
(2) – (1)

Conditional means
Former Latter Difference
(1)
(2)
(2) – (1)

0.46

0.35

-0.11***

0.49

0.30

-0.19***

Model 2: Quadratic
Satisfaction 5 and 6
0.21
Satisfaction 6 and 7
0.24
Satisfaction 7 and 8
0.28
Satisfaction 8 and 9
0.31
Satisfaction 9 and 10
0.34
Satisfaction 10 and 11
0.37
Satisfaction 11 and 12
0.40
Satisfaction 12 and 13
0.42
Satisfaction 13 and 14
0.43
Satisfaction 14 and 15
0.45
Satisfaction 15 and 16
0.45
Satisfaction 16 and 17
0.46
Satisfaction 17 and 18
0.46
Satisfaction 18 and 19
0.45
Satisfaction 19 and 20
0.44
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.24
0.28
0.31
0.34
0.37
0.40
0.42
0.43
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.46
0.45
0.44
0.43

0.03***
0.04***
0.03***
0.03***
0.03***
0.03***
0.02**
0.01*
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01

0.14
0.32
0.20
0.12
0.21
0.33
0.36
0.40
0.42
0.42
0.48
0.61
0.55
0.70
0.52

0.32
0.20
0.12
0.21
0.33
0.36
0.40
0.42
0.42
0.48
0.61
0.55
0.70
0.52
0.64

0.18**
-0.12
-0.08**
0.09**
0.12
0.03*
0.04*
0.02
0.00
0.06
0.13***
-0.06
0.15***
-0.18*
0.12

Discussion and Conclusion
One contribution of this essay is to apply descriptive and behavioral approaches
when evaluating the relationship between citizen attitudes toward government
performance and citizens’ collective behaviors and to provide a potential mechanism for
such relationship. Based on a theoretical explanation from Oliver (1977, 1980) and
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), this paper suggests a more informative model
considering the mechanisms of a non-linear relationship between citizen satisfaction and
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co-production at the individual level. The results suggest that citizens’ satisfaction with
public services are non-linearly related to the co-producing behaviors.
First of all, the results show the opposite direction to the first hypothesis. In
detail, very satisfied and moderately satisfied people participated in co-production more
than the people who are very dissatisfied and moderately dissatisfied with public
services. Such tendency may occur when satisfied citizens fear that the service quality
will become downgraded when they do not co-produce and, in turn, become dissatisfied.
On the other hand, there could be an endowment effect among citizens who participate in
co-production. In other words, citizens would value more of the public services that they
invested their resources to co-produce which lead them to have ownership (Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). Such effect may draw those citizens to be satisfied with the
services. People could also just co-produce when they are satisfied because they are
positively disposed toward the government.
The second hypothesis is partially supported. There is a negative quadratic
relationship between citizen satisfaction and co-production, which is heavily driven by
dissatisfied citizens. The probability of co-production increases as citizen satisfaction
increases. However, after the critical point of satisfaction, there are no significant
changes in the probability of co-production as satisfaction increases. Hence, the results
suggest a non-linear relationship between co-production and satisfaction. Furthermore,
these results indicate that descriptive and behavioral approaches should be combined to
broaden our understanding of citizen co-production.
The results of this essay are different from what Bovaird et al. (2015) found.
There can be various reasons for different findings. One can be different administrative
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cultures and different samples. While Bovaird and his colleagues collected samples from
five European countries that have parliamentary administrative cultures, the data used in
this study is collected in the US that has a constitution-based federal republic
administrative culture. Thus, the US citizens and European citizens may have different
perspectives on government performance and public services. Another possible reason is
different features of co-production. Bovaird and his colleagues studied co-production
related to safety, health, and protecting the environment at the individual and collective
levels. The current study measured co-production by whether people attend municipal
and parents’ association meetings, which are more abstract. Thus, collecting data from
various cultures, administrative systems, and public services is important to further
extend the understanding of the relationship between citizen attitudes and co-producing
behavior.
However, the current data are not sufficient to directly test such mechanisms of
the proposed model, since the data do not include expectations and perceived
performance of public services. To fully evaluate the proposed model, citizen
expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction should align with a public service.
For instance, citizen expectations, performance evaluations, and satisfaction with the
performance of the police in the neighborhood will be more closely related to
individuals’ joining a group, such as Neighbor Watch, rather than citizen co-production
in other urban services such as recycling.
Furthermore, this essay cannot conclude a causal relationship between citizen
satisfaction with public services and co-production since a cross-section data is used in
this paper. However, studying the causal relationship is important, especially when one
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wants to encourage citizen co-production. The ideal is to collect panel data that measures
citizen expectations for public services for the following year, the perceived quality of
public services and satisfaction with those, and co-producing behaviors. This will allow
scholars to study citizen co-production as a consequence of previous satisfaction with
public services. Another approach is conducting experiments. By manipulating citizen
satisfaction through randomly priming individuals to have high or low expectations and
perceived performance, scholars can understand how perceived performance is connected
to co-production behaviors through satisfaction. The two-by-two experimental design
where participants are primed to have either high or low expectations and either high or
low perceived performance would be appropriate. The random assignment can minimize
the bias from multicollinearity between expectations and perceived performance on
satisfaction. When individuals’ intention and participation in co-production are measured
after assessing satisfaction, the issues of endogeneity could be minimized.
For future studies, it will be beneficial to consider citizen co-production based on
the spectrum of public-private goods, depending on the level of rivalry or excludability of
a public service as suggested by public economics. For instance, is a person who cannot
escape from a negative externality, such as air pollution, is more likely to join
environmental groups and try to recycle, to use public transportation, and to prioritize the
government budget to improve environmental conditions? Who are the people that coproduce or not? Based on these research questions, we can understand the conditions and
features of public services that lead citizens and government officials to have different
patterns of co-production.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations

The three independent essays in this dissertation used psychological and
behavioral concepts to further understand citizen attitudes toward government
performance and collaborative behaviors in the public sector. The research examined how
cognitive mechanisms play a role in citizen understanding of government performance, in
forming citizen attitudes toward government, and in making decisions to participate in
co-production of public services. More specifically, construal level theory was used to
test how abstract and detailed thinking, together with the fit between type of thinking and
the content of information about government performance, would explain attitudes
toward government performance. Also, prospect theory and expectancy-disconfirmation
ideas were used to examine the cognitive mechanisms explaining why citizens decide to
co-produce in providing public services.
The first essay examined whether abstract or detailed mental construal would
influence the relationship between citizen expectations of government performance and
attitudes toward a government. Furthermore, it examined whether citizen attitudes toward
a government would be affected by the fit between cognitive mechanisms and the content
of information about why and how a government provided public services. When
cognitive mechanisms and the information contents about government performance fitted
well together, individuals would tend to feel right and attributed that feeling to the good
government performance. Based on construal level theory, the types of expectations
related to government performance and the information contents about why or how a
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government provided public services could share similar features. The theory, suggesting
that normative expectations of government performance and information about why a
government provided public services would focus on the desirability of public services,
would lead individuals to hold abstract thinking. On the other hand, the theory suggesting
empirical expectations of government performance and information about how a
government provided public services would focus on the feasibility of public services
would lead individuals to hold detailed thinking. Thus, it is anticipated that participants in
the matched cases (i.e., having normative expectations and reading a why-message;
having empirical expectations and reading a how-message) would form more positive
attitudes toward a government than those in the mismatched cases (i.e., having normative
expectations and reading a how-message; having empirical expectations and reading a
why-message).
As hypothesized, participants primed to hold normative expectations of
government performance tended to think in more abstract-terms than those primed to
hold empirical expectations of government performance. Also, the more participants felt
distant from their local government and thought in abstract terms, the less they favored
their hometown local government. The message content significantly moderated the
relationship between cognitive mechanisms and participants’ attitudes. Participants who
read the ‘why’ message were more responsive to the level of abstract thinking compared
to those who read the ‘how’ message. However, the results showed the opposite results
from what was hypothesized. For example, ones who were in an abstract-thinking mode
and exposed to the ‘why’ message tended to show more negative attitudes toward
governments compared to those who exposed to the ‘how’ message. Nevertheless, the
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results indicate that people holding normative or empirical expectations went through
distinct thinking processes, leading individuals to form different attitudes toward
governments.
The second essay (Chapter 3) tested the differences between abstract thinkers and
detailed thinkers on how citizens would judge satisfaction with government performance.
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the two vignettes using to manipulate
individuals to be in abstract or detailed thinking mode. After the manipulation,
participants’ expectations, perceived performance, and satisfaction related to government
performance were measured. Although the manipulation did not successfully shift
individuals’ way of thinking, the treatment and the level of abstract thinking moderated
the relationships between expectations and satisfaction related to government
performance. For example, participants who were primed to think in abstract terms
tended to have larger effects of expectations of government performance on satisfaction
with public services, compared to those who were primed to think in detailed terms.
There were no effects of the treatment and the level of abstract thinking on the
relationship between disconfirmation (the differences between expectations and
perceived performance) and satisfaction with government performance. Although it
seems that people carrying distinct cognitive mechanisms tended to differently shape
expectations and judge satisfaction related to government performance, the results were
inconclusive.
In Chapter 4, the essay assessed the relationship between citizen satisfaction with
government performance and co-production in the provision of public services with a
new model that incorporated prospect theory and the expectancy-disconfirmation model.
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The new model predicted a nonlinear relationship between the two. Since the prospect
theory framework proposed negativity bias and S-curve value function, it was expected
that citizens who were dissatisfied with public services would be disproportionately more
likely to co-produce. Also, a negative quadratic relationship between satisfaction and coproduction was anaticipated. Unlike initial hypothesis, neutral and satisfied citizens were
disproportionately more likely to co-produce than dissatisfied citizens. Also, there was a
negative quadratic relationship, which was heavily driven by dissatisfied citizens. In
general, the probability for citizens to participate in the meetings to co-produce
significantly increased until a certain level of satisfaction with government performance
(16.4 in the range of 5, very dissatisfied, to 20, very satisfied). After this level, the
probability for citizen co-production did not significantly change.
Implications
This dissertation provides evidence for the role of the mental mechanisms
underlying citizen attitudes toward government performance and collaborative behavior
in the public sector by using psychological concepts and methods. The essays in Chapter
2 and Chapter 3 used construal level theory to test how individuals’ thinking in abstract
or detailed terms was associated with their reactions to government performance and their
attitudes toward governments. The results offered only partial evidence supporting these
particular mechanisms, yet also suggest the value of testing these ideas further. Such
research, especially if it addresses some of the limitations of the current essays, may
indeed show that types of construal play a significant role in citizen perceptions and
evaluations of government performance.
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In addition, this dissertation could bridge with other disciplines that have also
examined cognitive mechanisms by applying psychological concepts and methods. For
instance, scholars studying public administration can learn from the studies of
communication strategies and consumer behaviors that applied the concept of
psychological distance. Also, researchers could evaluate how government officials make
decisions under uncertain situations by learning from other studies using prospect theory.
Through the multi-disciplinary approaches of studying behavioral public administration,
scholars could advance and develop theories and methods of both psychology and public
administration (Olsen, 2015).
To study the causal mechanisms of how individuals form attitudes and
satisfaction, this dissertation used experiments that allowed for randomly assigned
participants into groups with exogenous treatments. Many public administration studies
using cross-sectional and survey data face the issues of internal validity, such as
potentials misidentifying the causal relationships. For instance, many cross-sectional
survey studies of factors related to citizen satisfaction are unable to rule out the
possibility that satisfaction may also influence these factors through a reverse causation
process. However, the experiment conducted in the first essay, because the hypothesized
variables were manipulated, provided a means of concluding with a degree of confidence
what caused the effects. Citizen attitudes toward governments were indeed likely to be
caused by the manipulation of type of expectations and of type of information related to
government performance. By studying causal mechanisms of citizen perception of
government performance, the results from the experiments in the essays could contribute
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to improving the prediction of citizen attitudes by understanding the moderators and
mediators of the relationships between citizen attitudes and civic behaviors.
Another contribution of this dissertation is combining prospect theory and the
expectancy-disconfirmation ideas to test a novel claim about the relationship between
citizen satisfaction with government performance and citizen participation in public
service production. This enabled a test of a negative quadratic connection between citizen
satisfaction with public services and co-production. This approach, as it shifts thinking
from a linear to a non-linear one, could help scholars become aware of the especially
complex nature of how these variables relate to each other. Guided by this approach,
future studies could further refine the theories and methods to evaluate citizen satisfaction
and co-production, enhancing, for example, predictions related to who gets involved in
public service and how this involvement comes about, narrowing the gap between the
theory and the practice.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies
Although numerous psychological theories could be used to study the relationship
between citizen expectations of public services and citizen attitudes toward government
performance, in this dissertation only a subset of the possible approaches was used (e.g.,
only comparing normative and empirical expectations) and only a single theory was used
as a main guide, construal level theory. However, expectations are very complex in
nature. For instance, not only can expectations take other basic forms (Jacobsen, Snyder,
Saultz 2015), but individuals can hold both normative and empirical expectations at the
same time. Future studies should consider expectations that are both normative and
empirical, as well as expectations that take other forms, in order to achieve a more
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complete understanding of role of citizen expectations in attitudes formation toward
government performance.
It should be emphasized that this dissertation not only represents a novel
application of construal level theory to citizen attitudes toward government performance,
but it is also one of the few studies taking a psychological approach to this and related
topics. Hence, future studies are encouraged to apply diverse psychological theories such
as elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Such alternative theories, for
instance, could study the effect of information related to government performance on
citizen attitudes toward the performance. Theories could identify factors (e.g., individual
motivations to participate in co-production) that lead individuals to think carefully and
change citizen attitudes or opinions related to government performance.
Furthermore, future studies should integrate other potentially important factors
into a fuller picture of the complex process likely to be involved. The factors to be
considered, for instance, include citizens’ emotional valence toward government
performance, self-efficacy in the public sector (e.g., political efficacy), and individuals’
belief in the effects of their action. To understand citizen satisfaction and co-production
behavior more comprehensively, it is important to include other variables, consider
theories related to cognitive processes, and test the causal mechanisms among factors.
Future studies should replicate the present findings using different primes, varied
public services, and more representative populations. For instance, university students
may differ from the general population since they have had fewer experiences with public
services. Thus, university students might not be aware of themselves as active and
engaged consumers of public services. Future studies could use a larger sample from the
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general population through Mechanical Turk and Time-sharing Experiments for the
Social Sciences.
Although various public services were included in this dissertation, future studies
should consider the features of public service that might create different civic behaviors.
For example, studies could apply the concept of public goods from economics. The two
main features of public goods are non-excludability and non-rivalry. Non-excludability is
a concept that explains the difficulty to exclude individuals from using the good once it is
provided. For example, citizens could be excluded from medical services when they are
not qualified or are not paying for the services; whereas citizens cannot be excluded from
the policies related to national defense. Non-rivalry means that citizens can consume
public resources without competing against each other in terms of use. For instance,
using national parks has a very low rivalry since many people can use the park at the
same time. A public parking space has a high rivalry since another person cannot use the
space once a car is parked. Considering the degree of publicness in goods and services is
essential because it is closely related to the market for public goods. Moreover, the
markets set up the environments for civic behaviors, such as exiting the market or not.
Thus, future studies need to include the features of public goods and evaluate the
interactions among individuals’ psychological factors and their environments.
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APPENDIX A

Table A A 1 Survey items for Chapter 2
Variables
Questions and Likert-scales
Familiarity
How familiar are you with the (traffic signal system; road conditions;
sidewalk conditions) provided by your hometown local government
mentioned in this survey?
Not familiar
at all
1
Manipulation
Normative
Expectations

2

3

4

5

6

Very
familiar
7

What would you expect from public services provided by your
hometown local government?
Services: Overall performance of the local government; traffic signal
system; road conditions; sidewalk conditions
−
−
−
−
−

Empirical
Expectations

Should be excellent all the time
Should be excellent most of the time
Should be excellent some of the time
Should rarely be excellent
Should never be excellent

What would you expect from public services provided by your
hometown local government?
Services: Overall performance of the local government; traffic signal
system; road conditions; sidewalk conditions
−
−
−
−
−

Will be excellent all the time
Will be excellent most of the time
Will be excellent some of the time
Will rarely be excellent
Will never be excellent

Manipulation Check
Closeness
How closely connected do you feel to your hometown local
government?
Not
connected
at all
1

2

3
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4

5

6

Very
closely
connected
7

Table A A 1 Survey Items for Chapter 2 (continued)
Variables
Questions and Likert-scales
Likelihood
How likely or unlikely do you think your hometown local
government will meet your expectations for its services?
Very
unlikely
1
Time

2

3

4

5

6

Very
likely
7

When do you think your hometown local government will meet your
expectations for services?

Very
soon
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very far
in the
future
7

Message orientation
‘Why’
Why Does Your Hometown Local Government Provide Public
message
Services?
In accordance with the state constitution, cities enjoy home rule to
promote public purposes. As part of these, your hometown local
government provides the following public services: traffic signals,
road cleaning, and sidewalk maintenance.
i. Why your hometown local government controls the traffic signal
system:
The aim of controlling traffic lights is to have smooth and safe traffic.
Successful management of the traffic signal system brings less
congestion and accidents.
ii. Why your hometown local government cleans streets:
The goal of cleaning streets is a) to minimize chemicals and dust from
cars and b) to increase the efficiency of storm drains and prevent
clogs.
iii. Why your hometown local government maintains sidewalks:
The purpose of sidewalk management is to ensure safe travel for
everybody, especially for children and people with disabilities and to
increase access to various places such as schools, parks, public
transportation, etc.
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Table A A 1 Survey Items for Chapter 2 (continued)
Variables
Questions and Likert-scales
‘How’
How Does Your Hometown Local Government Provide Public
message
Services?
Your hometown local government serves the population with diverse
public services, depending on social and economic situations. To
meet the public needs, your hometown local government provides the
following public services: traffic signals, road cleaning, and sidewalk
maintenance.
i. How your hometown local government controls the traffic signal
system:
Your hometown local government uses an automatic control system
that calculates the traffic flow and adjusts the time intervals of traffic
signals creating smooth traffic.
ii. How your hometown local government cleans streets:
Once a month, your hometown local government asks residents in
each district to park elsewhere and sweeps and washes the streets in
the district. This activity operates at the time when there is the least
traffic of the day.
iii. How your hometown local government maintains sidewalks:
Your hometown local government regularly inspects and citizens
report the condition of sidewalks, whether sidewalks are collapsed,
has an unbalanced surface, etc. After the troubles are identified, your
hometown local government paves the damaged sidewalks with
cement or replaces defective curbs.
Citizen Attitudes
Confidence
How confident or not confident are you in your hometown local
government providing public services?
Not
confident
at all
1
Feeling

2

3

4

5

6

Very
confident
7

How positive or negative do you feel toward your hometown local
government in providing public services?
Not
confident
at all
1

2

3
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4

5

6

Very
confident
7

Table A A 1 Survey Items for Chapter 2 (continued)
Variables
Questions and Likert-scales
Importance
How important do you think your hometown local government is for
providing public services?
Not
confident
at all
1
Trust in
Government

4

5

6

2

3

4

5

6

A lot
7

Dillon's Rule states that local governments are creatures of their state
government. But the real purpose of this question is to check whether
you're paying attention. Ignore your answers to the other questions.
This is not related to the survey. This question is to check your
attention. Only press three on the seven-point scale.
Scale
1

Controls
Age

3

To what extent do you trust your hometown local government?
Not at all
1

Attention
Check

2

Very
confident
7

2

3

4

5

6

Scale
7

What is your age? ____________________
Decline to answer.

Gender

What is your gender?
_____ Male
_____ Female
_____ Decline to answer.

Ideology

In general, would you describe your political views as
Very liberal
1

2

3
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4

Very
conservative
5

Table A A 1 Survey Items for Chapter 2 (continued)
Variables
Questions and Likert-scales
Ethnic
Which of the following describes your race? White, Black or African
Background
American, Asian or Asian American or some other race.

Perceived
Performance

Satisfaction

− White (e.g., Caucasian, European, Irish, Italian, Arab, Middle
Eastern)
− Black or African-American (e.g., Negro, Kenyan, Nigerian,
Haitian)
− Asian or Asian-American (e.g., Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino,
Vietnamese or other Asian origin groups)
− Native American/American Indian/Alaska Native
− Pacific Islander/Native Hawaiian
− Hispanic/Latino (e.g., Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban)
− Some other race (please specify)
− Don't know
− Decline to answer.
Before you took this survey, how would you rate the overall quality
of the public services, that goes beyond those services related to traffic
lights, streets, and sidewalks provided by your hometown local
government (those including traffic, roads, and sidewalks and
beyond)?
Very
poor
Excellent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Before you took this survey, how satisfied are you with the
performance of hometown local government’s overall services, that
goes beyond those related services to traffic lights, streets, and
sidewalks (those including traffic, roads, and sidewalks and beyond)?
Very
dissatisfied
1

2

3
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4

5

6

Very
satisfied
7

APPENDIX B
Table A B 1 Survey items for Chapter 3
Variables
Questions and Likert-scales
Trust in
To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?
Government
Not at all
A lot
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Familiarity
How familiar are you with the (traffic signal system; road
conditions; sidewalk conditions) provided by your hometown local
government mentioned in this survey?
Not
familiar
Very
at all
familiar
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Manipulation
‘Now’
CallGov Is Here for You Now!
Low construal
condition
Your hometown local government is trying to find a way to
(Psychologically
effectively correct everyday problems in delivering services, such as
near condition)
garbage pickups, and improve the community.
You Can Use It Now
Your hometown local government recently launched a website and
a mobile app, “CallGov.” Through CallGov, individuals now have
easier access to their government. There are some defects that are
difficult for your local government to efficiently identify, such as
potholes in the streets, inefficient traffic light systems, and cracks in
the sidewalks. When residents submit defects that the government
cannot effectively detect, your hometown local government will
respond to the information, correct the fault, and improve the
quality of public services. Through this project, your hometown
local government and residents can collaborate to make a safer and
cleaner community.
Your hometown local government is now collecting feedback from
the users and promoting the program to citizens for its wide usage.
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Table A B 1 Survey Items for Chapter 3 (continued)
Variables
Questions and Likert-scales
‘Next year’
The New Program, CallGov, Will Come Later Next Year
High construal
condition
The local government is trying to find a way to serve citizens
(Psychologically
better, for example, in garbage pickups and cleaning streets, and
distant
improve the community.
condition)
It’s Coming Next Year
Next year, your local government is planning to launch a
website and a mobile app, “CallGov.” The goal of CallGov is to
help individuals have easier access to their local government.
There are some problems that are difficult for your local
government to efficiently identify, such as potholes in the
streets, inefficient traffic light systems, and cracks in the
sidewalks. When residents report these problem, the local
government will respond to the information, correct the fault,
and improve the quality of public services. Through this project,
the local government and residents can collaborate to create a
safer and cleaner community.
In order to launch this program sometime next year, the local
government is now collecting related information and securing
revenue for the project.
Manipulation Check
Time
When do you think this program, ‘CallGov,’ will be launched and
implemented in your hometown local community?
Very
Never
soon
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Likely to
How likely or unlikely would you be to download and use
Download
‘CallGov?’
Very
Very
unlikely
likely
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Likely to use
How many out of 10 defects will you report through “CallGov?”
Every
None
time
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Table A B 1 Survey Items for Chapter 3 (continued)
Variables
Questions and Likert-scales
Expectations
How would you rate your expectations for the (overall quality of the
public services; effectiveness of traffic signal system; condition of
road maintenance; condition of sidewalk maintenance) which (are/is)
managed by your hometown local government?
Very low
Very high
expectations
expectations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Perceived
How would you rate the (overall quality of the public services;
performance
effectiveness of traffic signal system; condition of road maintenance;
condition of sidewalk maintenance) provided by your hometown local
government?
Poor
Excellent
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Satisfaction
How satisfied are you with the performance of your hometown local
government’s (overall services; management of traffic signal systems;
management of road maintenance; management of sidewalk
maintenance)?
Neither
satisfied
Very
nor
Very
dissatisfied
dissatisfied
satisfied
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Controls
Age
Gender

Ideology

What is your age? ____________________
Decline to answer.
What is your gender?
_____ Male
_____ Female
_____ Decline to answer.
In general, would you describe your political views as
Very liberal
1

2

3
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4

Very
conservative
5

Table A B 1 Survey Items for Chapter 3 (continued)
Variables
Questions and Likert-scales
Which of the following describes your race? White, Black or African
American, Asian or Asian American or some other race.

Ethnic
Background

_____ White (e.g., Caucasian, European, Irish, Italian, Arab,
Middle Eastern)
_____ Black or African-American (e.g., Negro, Kenyan,
Nigerian, Haitian)
_____ Asian or Asian-American (e.g., Asian Indian, Chinese,
Filipino, Vietnamese or other Asian origin groups)
_____ Native American/American Indian/Alaska Native
_____ Pacific Islander/Native Hawaiian
_____ Hispanic/Latino (e.g., Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban)
_____ Some other race (please specify)
_____ Don't know.
_____ Decline to answer.
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APPENDIX C

Table A C 1 Descriptive statistics for age, number of people in a household, and ideology
Linearized
Variables
Mean
Min
Max
S.E.
Age
47.24
0.99
19
88
No. of people in
2.85
0.08
1
10
your household
Ideology
6.12
0.25
1
10
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Table A C 2 Proportions of the socio-economic variables
Variables
Proportion
Gender
Female
0.56
Male
0.44
Marital status
Single
0.22
In a relationship
0.59
Divorced or Separated
0.19
Monthly income
Low: $2,720 or less
0.46
Middle: $2,721 - $5,325
0.29
High: $5,326 or more
0.25
Education
High school or less
0.42
College
0.50
Post graduate
0.08
Work situation
Not in labor force
0.43
In labor force
0.57
Partisanship
Republicans
0.18
Democrats
0.37
Independent
0.32
Other
0.13
Religion
Catholic
0.28
Protestant
0.43
No religion
0.10
Others
0.20
Race
White
0.68
Black
0.11
Hispanic
0.17
Others
0.05
Region
West
0.23
Midwest
0.22
Northeast
0.15
South
0.40
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Table A C 3 Descriptive statistics and questions related to key variables
Variables

Questions

Co-production

Never: 0
Co-Produce: 1 when an individual at least attended a meeting
Meetings of a community improvement committee or
association
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Citizen
satisfaction

Dissatisfaction

Mean

Linearized
SD

Min

0.42

0.06

0

1.44

0.07

1
Never

Meetings of a parents’ association at school

1.43

0.08

Averaged

13.27

0.14

2.62

In general, would you say that you are very satisfied,
satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way
democracy works in the United States?
In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or
very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your
neighborhood?
And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you
very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied
with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?
And the quality of public schools? Are you...
And the quality of public medical and health services? Are
you...
Dissatisfied: 1 if average satisfaction < 12.5
Not dissatisfied: 0 if average satisfaction 12.49

Max
1

1
5
Very
dissatisfied

4
Once a
week
4
20
Very
satisfied

0.04

1

4

2.94

0.04

1

4

2.49

0.06

1

4

2.55

0.03

1

4

2.67

0.05

1

4

0.35

0.01

0

1

Table A C 3 Descriptive statistics and questions related to key variables (continued)
Variables
Questions
Mean
Trust in
political
institutions
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Approval for
President

Averaged
To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are
well protected by the political system of the United States?
To what extent do you respect the political institutions of the
United States?
To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political
system of the United States?
To what extent do you think that one should support the
political system of the United States?
To what extent do you trust political parties?
To what extent do you trust the President?
Speaking in general of the current administration, how would
you rate the job performance of President Barack Obama?

Linearized
SD

Min

Max

3.65

0.14

1
Not at all

7
A lot

3.63

0.09

1

7

3.59

0.18

1

7

4.19

0.14

1

7

4.63

0.14

1

7

2.88
2.95

0.15
0.15

3.22

0.09

1
1
1
Very bad

7
7
5
Very good

Table A C 4 Factor loadings based on a principal components analysis with orthogonal
rotation for co-production, citizen satisfaction, and trust in political institutions
Questions
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Co-production
Meetings of a community improvement committee
0.80
or association
Meetings of a parents’ association at school
0.78
Meetings of any religious organization
0.65
Citizen satisfaction
In general, would you say that you are very satisfied,
satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the
way democracy works in the United States?
In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied,
dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the
performance of the police in your neighborhood?
And thinking about this city/area where you live, are
you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very
dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads,
and highways?
And the quality of public schools? Are you...
And the quality of public medical and health
services? Are you...
Trust in political institutions
To what extent do you think the courts in the United
States guarantee a fair trial?
To what extent do you respect the political
institutions of the United States?
To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic
rights are well protected by the political system of
the United States?
To what extent do you feel proud of living under the
political system of the United States?
To what extent do you think that one should support
the political system of the United States?
To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
To what extent do you trust the justice system?
To what extent do you trust the U.S. Congress?
To what extent do you trust the Police?
To what extent do you trust political parties?
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0.57

-

-

0.68

-

-

0.70

-

-

0.75

-

-

0.69

-

-

0.35

0.64

0.09

0.79

0.11

0.31

0.70

0.27

0.30

0.75

0.37

0.08

0.65

0.43

0.03

0.19
0.51
0.68
0.17
0.61

0.73
0.62
0.18
0.81
0.16

-0.15
0.26
0.27
0.11
0.48

Table A C 4 Factor loadings based on a principal components analysis with orthogonal
rotation for co-production, citizen satisfaction, and Trust in political institutions
(continued)
Questions
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Trust in political institutions
To what extent do you trust the President?
0.19
-0.06
0.81
To what extent do you trust the local or municipal
0.20
0.65
0.43
government?
To what extent do you trust the mass media?
0.23
0.18
0.77
To what extent do you trust elections in this country?
0.37
0.41
0.53
Bolded numbers are the items that are highly loading for a certain factor but not for
other factors.

The analysis used principal component factor analysis with orthogonal rotation
for co-production, citizen satisfaction, and trust in political institution to create indices for
those variables. Table A 4 in Appendix provides the loading factors for individual items
related to co-production, citizen satisfaction, and trust in political institutions.
Initially, three items measured co-production: attending municipal meetings to
improve the community, parents’ association, and religious meetings. Although all three
items are loaded in one factor with the variance of 1.67 in principal component factor
analysis, Cronbach’s alpha measures suggest people who attend religious meetings are
different from people who attend or do not attend other meetings. When I drop the item
that measures individuals’ attendance in religious meetings, Cronbach’s alpha increases
from 0.53 to 0.61, which meets the recommended value of 0.6 for exploratory studies in
social sciences (Hair et al., 2006; Hinton et al., 2004). The response is the frequency of
attending a meeting: 1, never, 2, once or twice a year, 3, once or twice a month, and 4,
one a week. However, merely creating an index by adding the ratings is not accurate. In
other words, the same ratings may not correctly reflect levels of individuals’ coproduction. For example, Person A and Person B have 4 in the level of attendance.
121

Person A never attends municipal meetings (rating 1) but attend parents’ association once
or twice a month (rating 3); while Person B attends both meetings once or twice a year
(both are rating 2). In this example, it is difficult to say that the level of co-production by
Person A and Person B is the same.
The main explanatory variable, citizen satisfaction, is averaged across five areas:
the democratic system in the U.S., police performance, conditions of roads, public school
services, and public health services. Cronbach’s alpha for these five items is 0.713. The
results from principal component factor analysis suggest that all five items are loaded in a
factor with the variance of 2.32, which explains 46.32% of total variance.
Cronbach’s alpha for the 14 items measuring trust in political institutions is 0.90
suggesting very high internal consistency among the items. However, principal
component factor analysis with orthogonal rotation suggests multiple factors. In this
article, two dimensions are selected since they show the most straightforward loaded
factors with Eigenvalues exceeding 1.0. However, I loaded the third factor, with
Eigenvalue of 0.90, to have a clearer view of the loading factors in Factor 1 and Factor 2.
Factor 1 with the variance of 3.64 (26.01% of total variance) seems to show how much
people trust, have confidence, and support political systems and institutions. Factor 2
with 3.07 (21.93% of total variance) illustrates how much people trust and have
confidence in regulatory institutions such as judicial, armed force and police. Both factors
are highly correlated (correlation coefficient is 0.62). The model includes the former
factor to focus on trust in political institutions related to social and community aspects,
not regulatory agents. Cronbach’s alpha for the six items loaded in the former factor is
0.87.
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Table A C 4 Means of Model 1 and Model 2 with non-subpopulation and subpopulation conditions
Trust Approval of
Age
People in
Gender
Relationship Status
Variables
President
Household
Male
Female
Single
In
Separate
Unconditional for subpopulation
Model 1 & 2
3.65
3.22
47.24
2.85
0.44
0.56
0.22
0.59
0.19
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Conditional for subpopulation
Satisfied
4.06
Dissatisfied
2.87
Satisfaction 5
1.33
Satisfaction 6
1.26
Satisfaction 7
2.36
Satisfaction 8
1.94
Satisfaction 9
3.16
Satisfaction 10
3.00
Satisfaction 11
2.69
Satisfaction 12
3.14
Satisfaction 13
3.44
Satisfaction 14
3.75
Satisfaction 15
4.09
Satisfaction 16
4.71
Satisfaction 17
4.96
Satisfaction 18
5.37
Satisfaction 19
4.85
Satisfaction 20
5.48

3.09
3.47
3.47
3.06
3.66
3.17
3.53
3.07
3.70
3.57
3.13
3.80
2.87
3.10
2.57
2.00
2.53
2.05

49.04
43.89
41.61
43.01
38.73
35.97
41.09
45.94
33.39
45.4
45.10
52.97
50.07
47.54
49.42
49.69
49.16
35.31

2.80
2.94
1.90
3.26
2.41
2.56
2.73
2.90
3.03
3.13
3.03
2.49
2.43
3.21
3.32
3.58
2.38
3.12

0.47
0.39
0.43
0.25
0.47
0.55
0.71
0.43
0.20
0.36
0.48
0.49
0.53
0.28
0.53
0.34
0.31
0.27

0.53
0.61
0.57
0.75
0.53
0.45
0.29
0.57
0.80
0.64
0.52
0.51
0.47
0.72
0.47
0.66
0.69
0.73

0.22
0.24
0.60
0.51
0.58
0.44
0.22
0.16
0.14
0.28
0.12
0.26
0.16
0.26
0.11
0.20
0.45

0.59
0.59
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.48
0.55
0.65
0.70
0.56
0.56
0.57
0.70
0.62
0.83
0.58
0.29

0.19
0.59
3
0.08
0.09
0.23
0.20
0.16
0.16
0.33
0.18
0.14
0.11
0.06
0.22
0.26

Table A C 5 Means of Model 1 and Model 2 with non-subpopulation and subpopulation conditions (continued)
Monthly Income
Education Level
Labor Force
Variables
Low
Middle
High
HS/less
College
Post Grad
Out
In
Unconditional to subpopulation
Model 1 & 2
0.46
0.29
0.25
0.42
0.50
0.08
0.43
0.57
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Conditional to subpopulation
Satisfied
0.41
Dissatisfied
0.54
Satisfaction 5
0.60
Satisfaction 6
0.25
Satisfaction 7
0.69
Satisfaction 8
0.85
Satisfaction 9
0.80
Satisfaction 10
0.49
Satisfaction 11
0.50
Satisfaction 12
0.45
Satisfaction 13
0.41
Satisfaction 14
0.43
Satisfaction 15
0.42
Satisfaction 16
0.42
Satisfaction 17
0.29
Satisfaction 18
0.47
Satisfaction 19
0.35
Satisfaction 20
0.45

0.30
0.27
0.40
0.27
0.08
0.10
0.07
0.33
0.35
0.31
0.32
0.34
0.25
0.19
0.44
0.19
0.42
0.26

0.29
0.18
0.48
0.24
0.05
0.13
0.18
0.15
0.24
0.26
0.23
0.33
0.39
0.27
0.34
0.23
0.29

0.44
0.38
0.60
0.53
0.15
0.18
0.51
0.43
0.37
0.36
0.50
0.41
0.59
0.56
0.38
0.36
0.56

0.47
0.55
0.40
2
0.39
0.85
0.66
0.40
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.44
0.51
0.33
0.36
0.29
0.42
0.26

0.09
0.07
0.08
0.16
0.10
0.03
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.34
0.21
0.18

0.44
0.40
0.43
0.25
0.32
0.29
0.27
0.40
0.59
0.34
0.46
0.50
0.37
0.42
0.53
0.29
0.76
-

0.56
0.60
0.057
0.75
0.68
0.71
0.73
0.60
0.41
0.66
0.54
0.50
0.63
0.58
0.47
0.71
0.24
1

Ideology
6.12

6.36
5.68
7.37
8.47
5.52
3.33
6.09
4.66
5.69
6.35
6.30
6.33
6.51
7.12
5.64
5.79
6.11
7.52

Table A C 5 Means of Model 1 and Model 2 with non-subpopulation and subpopulation conditions (continued)
Partisanship
Religion
Variables
Others
Republican Democrats Independence Catholic Protestant
None
Others
Unconditional to subpopulation
Model 1 & 2
0.13
0.18
0.37
0.32
0.27
0.43
0.10
0.20

125

Conditional for subpopulation
Satisfied
0.12
Dissatisfied
0.13
Satisfaction 5
Satisfaction 6
0.48
Satisfaction 7
0.30
Satisfaction 8
0.44
Satisfaction 9
0.05
Satisfaction 10
0.18
Satisfaction 11
0.12
Satisfaction 12
0.06
Satisfaction 13
0.21
Satisfaction 14
0.06
Satisfaction 15
0.08
Satisfaction 16
0.03
Satisfaction 17
0.20
Satisfaction 18
0.30
Satisfaction 19
Satisfaction 20
0.18

0.21
0.14
0.10
0.07
0.11
0.04
0.26
0.15
0.19
0.24
0.15
0.23
0.24
0.27
0.15
0.53

0.37
0.36
0.17
0.36
0.24
0.67
0.38
0.22
0.38
0.30
0.29
0.49
0.40
0.36
0.34
0.49
0.29

0.30
0.36
0.83
0.52
0.23
0.25
0.16
0.39
0.41
0.40
0.30
0.41
0.28
0.34
0.20
0.09
0.36
-

0.29
0.24
0.27
0.15
0.07
0.58
0.08
0.13
0.34
0.28
0.22
0.29
0.47
0.22
0.46
0.28
0.27

0.46
0.38
0.40
0.35
0.26
0.18
0.43
0.49
0.40
0.44
0.58
0.40
0.48
0.43
0.39
0.44
0.47

0.08
0.14
0.43
0.25
0.37
0.44
0.13
0.17
0.10
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.08
0.01
0.08
0.21
-

0.18
0.23
0.17
0.48
0.12
0.23
0.12
0.32
0.28
0.19
0.20
0.11
0.24
0.04
0.26
0.15
0.07
0.26

Ethnicity
White
0.68

0.67
0.70
0.83
0.52
0.59
0.81
0.90
0.60
0.64
0.75
0.72
0.80
0.65
0.49
0.57
0.51
0.58
0.44

Table A C 5 Means of Model 1 and Model 2 with non-subpopulation and subpopulation conditions (continued)
Ethnicity
Areas
Variables
Black
Hispanic
Others
West
Midwest Northeast
South
Unconditional for subpopulation
Model 1 & 2
0.11
0.17
0.05
0.23
0.22
0.15
0.40
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Conditional for subpopulation
Satisfied
0.11
Dissatisfied
0.10
Satisfaction 5
0.17
Satisfaction 6
Satisfaction 7
0.41
Satisfaction 8
0.15
Satisfaction 9
0.08
Satisfaction 10
0.13
Satisfaction 11
0.07
Satisfaction 12
0.05
Satisfaction 13
0.13
Satisfaction 14
0.02
Satisfaction 15
0.12
Satisfaction 16
0.11
Satisfaction 17
0.26
Satisfaction 18
0.05
Satisfaction 19
0.20
Satisfaction 20
0.29

0.17
0.15
0.04
0.19
0.23
0.17
0.13
0.16
0.14
0.38
0.17
0.35
0.21
-

0.04
0.05
0.48
0.02
0.08
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.09
0.02
0.09
0.26

0.24
0.23
0.57
0.27
0.20
0.12
0.08
0.26
0.38
0.15
0.21
0.41
0.22
0.26
0.06
0.09
0.26

0.22
0.22
0.48
0.51
0.45
0.20
0.09
0.21
0.33
0.16
0.20
0.17
0.21
0.06
0.38
0.27

0.14
0.16
0.56
0.17
0.27
0.10
0.07
0.19
0.10
0.14
0.16
0.15
0.15
0.19
0.12
0.18

0.40
0.39
0.43
0.25
0.23
0.19
0.20
0.44
0.46
0.44
0.37
0.28
0.42
0.43
0.58
0.66
0.50
0.29
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